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DISCLOSING DEVIATIONS: USING 
GUIDELINES TO NUDGE AND EMPOWER 
PHYSICIAN-PATIENT DECISION MAKING 
Melissa Ballengee Alexander* 
Americans fail to receive recommended care roughly half the time, reflecting 
poor decision making that threatens their health. This Article offers an innovative 
solution: require physicians to disclose clinical practice guideline recommenda-
tions to patients during informed consent. Behavioral economics suggests that in-
sisting physicians and patients discuss guidelines, before deviating from them, 
could be surprisingly effective at nudging more rational care choices. At the same 
time, such disclosure should also educate and empower patients, serving auton-
omy. 
Previous scholarship on unwarranted variances in care has focused primar-
ily on malpractice reforms, largely ignoring the role of cognitive bias and the im-
portance of patients receiving empirically based, consensus recommendations. 
This Article provides important new analysis of the connection between cognitive 
bias in physician decision making and practice guidelines. It offers key insights 
on aligning informed consent with patient autonomy and begins an important 
dialogue on elevating the salience of guidelines, thereby improving physician-
patient decision making practices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“We’re literally dying, waiting for the practice of medicine to catch up 
with medical knowledge . . . . [A] thousand Americans die each week because 
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the care they get is not consistent with the care that medical science tells us 
they should get.”1 Americans fail to receive recommended health care almost 
half of the time, and these shortcomings reflect serious problems with the deci-
sion making of both physicians and patients.2 Better adherence to clinical prac-
tice guidelines (“Guideline(s)”) would improve quality of care.3 Yet, physicians 
are frequently unfamiliar with Guideline recommendations and almost never 
                                                        
1  Martin Sipkoff, 9 Ways to Reduce Unwarranted Variation, MANAGED CARE (Nov. 1, 
2003), https://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/2003/11/9-ways-reduce-unwarranted-var 
iation [https://perma.cc/5WTC-MF5S] (quoting NAT’L COMM. FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE, 
THE STATE OF HEALTH CARE QUALITY 2003 (2003)). 
2  Elizabeth A. McGlynn et al., The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults in the United 
States, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2635, 2641 (2003) (“[P]articipants received 54.9 percent of 
recommended care.”). 
3  INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES WE CAN TRUST, 
REPORT BRIEF 1, 4 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 IOM STANDARDS: REPORT BRIEF] (stating these 
guidelines optimize care by providing the information necessary for “selecting the best care 
for a unique patient based on his or her preferences” and “aid clinicians and patients alike in 
determining the best treatment options”); M. Hassan Murad, Clinical Practice Guidelines: A 
Primer on Development and Dissemination, 92 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 423, 431 (2017) (“Em-
pirical evidence shows that guidelines improve patient outcomes.”); see also Julie M. Fritz et 
al., Does Adherence to the Guideline Recommendation for Active Treatments Improve the 
Quality of Care for Patients with Acute Low Back Pain Delivered by Physical Therapists?, 
45 MED. CARE 973 (2007) (concluding adherence to guideline for low back pain leads to bet-
ter clinical outcomes and lower costs); Kimberly A. Hepner et al., The Effect of Adherence to 
Practice Guidelines on Depression Outcomes, 147 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 320 (2007) 
(finding that guideline adherence in depression care is linked to better outcomes); Marco 
Proietti et al., Adherence to Antithrombotic Therapy Guidelines Improves Mortality Among 
Elderly Patients with Atrial Fibrillation: Insights from the REPOSI Study, 105 CLINICAL 
RES. CARDIOLOGY 912 (2016) (concluding that guideline adherence was associated with 
lower mortality among elderly atrial fibrillation patients); M.H. Wilke et al., Guideline-
Adherent Initial Intravenous Antibiotic Therapy for Hospital-Acquired/Ventilator-Associated 
Pneumonia is Clinically Superior, Saves Lives and is Cheaper than Non Guideline Adherent 
Therapy, 16 EUR. J. MED. RES. 315 (2011) (finding that guidelines for pneumonia saved 
lives, money, and were overall superior); Zachary I. Willis et al., Effect of a Clinical Prac-
tice Guideline for Pediatric Complicated Appendicitis, 151 JAMA SURGERY 1 (2016) (find-
ing that guidelines for the management of pediatric complicated appendicitis improved pa-
tient outcomes); Achim Wöckel et al., Effects of Guideline Adherence in Primary Breast 
Cancer—A 5-year Multi-Center Cohort Study of 3976 Patients, 19 BREAST 120 (2010) (find-
ing less guideline adherence tracked lower survival in breast cancer patients); Charlotte Z. 
Woods-Hill et al., Association of a Clinical Practice Guideline with Blood Culture Use in 
Critically Ill Children, 171 JAMA PEDIATRICS 157 (2017) (finding guidelines improve la-
boratory results for critically ill children). But see Cynthia M. Boyd et al., Clinical Practice 
Guidelines and Quality of Care for Older Patients with Multiple Comorbid Disease: Impli-
cations for Pay for Performance, 294 JAMA 716 (2005) (finding that guidelines did not pro-
vide the best care for elderly patients with comorbidity). 
Guidelines are statements developed by multi-disciplinary expert panels that include recom-
mendations, based on a systematic review of evidence and an assessment of the benefits and 
harms of alternative care options. See 2011 IOM STANDARDS: REPORT BRIEF, supra, at 1. 
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tell patients about them.4 Even when aware of Guidelines, cognitive biases lead 
physicians to discount them.5 
Existing legal scholarship on unwarranted care variance has focused pri-
marily on malpractice reforms.6 This Article will propose an innovative solu-
tion: require physicians to disclose Guideline recommendations to patients as 
part of informed consent, prior to any deviation. Behavioral economics sug-
gests that by countering cognitive biases, informed consent discussion could be 
a surprisingly effective nudge toward guideline adherence. 
Part I of this Article will describe widespread, unwarranted variances in 
care. Part II will highlight the comparative advantage guidelines offer over ad 
hoc physician-patient decision making. Next, Part III will explain how insuffi-
cient knowledge of Guidelines, cognitive biases, and lack of legal disclosure 
obligation all contribute to current guideline under-adherence.7 Together, Parts 
                                                        
4  Michael D. Cabana et al., Why Don’t Physicians Follow Clinical Practice Guidelines? A 
Framework for Improvement, 282 JAMA 1458, 1463 (1999); Donald E. Casey, Jr., Why 
Don’t Physicians (and Patients) Consistently Follow Clinical Practice Guidelines, 173 
JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1581, 1581–82 (2013); Naomi Fearns et al., What Do Patients and 
the Public Know About Clinical Practice Guidelines and What Do They Want from Them? A 
Qualitative Study, BMC HEALTH SERVS. RES., Feb. 24, 2016, at 1, 11 (finding in a Scotland 
study that “[t]he public is generally unaware of the existence of guidelines, though people 
are enthusiastic about them once they are made aware of them”). 
5  See infra Section III.B. 
6  See Ronen Avraham, Overlooked and Underused: Clinical Practice Guidelines and Mal-
practice Liability for Independent Physicians, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 273, 278 (2014); Mark A. 
Hall, The Defensive Effect of Medical Practice Policies in Malpractice Litigation, 54 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 121 (1991); Marshall B. Kapp, Getting Physicians and Patients to 
Choose Wisely: Does the Law Help or Hurt?, 46 U. TOL. L. REV. 529, 536–37 (2015); Max-
well J. Mehlman, Professional Power and the Standard of Care in Medicine, 44 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 1165, 1169 (2012); Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical 
Practice Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 648 (2001). 
But see Wendy Netter Epstein, Nudging Patient Decision-Making, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1255, 
1283–85, 1301 (2017) (analyzing patient instability of preferences and systematic decision 
making biases and mistakes and recommending that physicians frame defaults for care in-
stead of providing a menu of options to patients); John E. Wennberg & Philip G. Peters, Jr., 
Unwarranted Variations in the Quality of Health Care: Can the Law Help Medicine Provide 
a Remedy/Remedies?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 925, 938 (2002) (proposing malpractice re-
forms but also recommending that physicians use informed choice rather than consent to 
elicit patient values for preference-sensitive care). 
7  Generally, cognitive bias in physician decision making remains an under-explored area of 
legal scholarship. But see Thomas L. Greaney, Economic Regulation of Physicians: A Be-
havioral Economics Perspective, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1189, 1189–90 (2009) (applying be-
havioral economics to physician decision making to consider how to structure financial in-
centives); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing 
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1090 (2000) 
(seminal law and economics article, briefly analyzing physician decision making); Jessica 
Mantel, The Myth of the Independent Physician: Implications for Health Law, Policy, and 
Ethics, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 455, 501–05 (2013) (discussing the impact of organization 
culture in light of physicians’ use of cognitive schema). But cf. Epstein, supra note 6, at 
1260, 1284 n.166, 1289 (focusing on patient bias but also acknowledging that physicians 
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II and III will present an important new legal analysis of the connection be-
tween cognitive bias in physician decision making and guidelines. Part IV will 
argue that requiring physicians to disclose guideline recommendations to pa-
tients would improve decision making, without limiting physician discretion or 
patient choice. Then, it will offer a normative perspective on why this prescrip-
tive remedy better aligns decision making practices with the ethical principles 
underlying healthcare: autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice. 
Part IV will include significant new insights on reforming informed consent to 
incorporate empiric evidence from health literacy and behavioral economics. 
I. POOR DECISION MAKING UNDERMINES QUALITY OF CARE AND 
THREATENS HEALTH 
For decades, scholars have recognized substantial, unjustified variances in 
care approaches between physicians for patients with similar diagnoses.8 For 
example, a patient with diabetes in Chicago is half as likely to receive a test 
monitoring blood lipids as a similar patient in Fort Lauderdale, despite over-
whelming evidence that such test should be performed.9 A patient with heart 
disease in Bloomington is three times more likely to undergo bypass surgery 
than a similar patient in Albuquerque.10 These wide variances exist not only be-
tween geographic regions but also between individual physicians in a single 
hospital.11 While some of these variations may be explained by differences in 
clinical need or patient preference, a significant percentage do not appear to be 
                                                                                                                                
suffer biases); Barbara A. Noah, The (Ir)rationality of (Un)informed Consent, 34 QUINNIPIAC 
L. REV. 691, 697–98 (2016) (essay briefly discussing cognitive bias in the context of neces-
sary fallibility in medical decision making); Victoria A. Shaffer, Nudges for Health Policy: 
Effectiveness and Limitations, 82 MO. L. REV. 727, 728–35 (2017) (short discussion of suc-
cessful physician nudges). 
8  See generally John E. Wennberg, Unwarranted Variations in Healthcare Delivery: Impli-
cations for Academic Medical Centres, 325 BMJ 961 (2002). 
9  THE DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE, THE QUALITY OF MEDICAL CARE IN THE UNITED 
STATES: A REPORT ON THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 120–21 (John E. Wennberg & Megan 
McAndrew Cooper eds., 1999). 
10  Id. at 156. 
11  JONATHON SKINNER & ELLIOTT S. FISHER, THE DARTMOUTH INST. FOR HEALTH POLICY & 
CLINICAL PRACTICE, REFLECTIONS ON GEOGRAPHIC VARIATIONS IN U.S. HEALTH CARE 1 
(2010) (“some primary care physicians order more than twice as many CT scans as their col-
leagues in the same practice”); Yusuke Tsugawa et al., Variation in Physician Spending and 
Association with Patient Outcomes, 177 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 675, 681 (2017) (care 
spending varies more across individual physicians than across hospitals and is not associated 
with better outcomes); Key Issues: Racial Disparities, DARTMOUTH ATLAS HEALTH CARE, htt 
p://archive.dartmouthatlas.org/keyissues/issue.aspx?con=2942 [https://perma.cc/Y6FK-F5B 
Z] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) [hereinafter Dartmouth—Racial Disparities] (recognizing “both 
unequal treatment within a hospital or by a given provider, and unequal treatment because of 
where people live”). 
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so justified.12 Too often, medical practice remains divorced from scientific 
method and empiric evidence.13 
In fact, physicians commonly (but unintentionally) undertreat, overtreat or 
mistreat patients, and the resulting costs to patients and to the U.S. healthcare 
system are staggering.14 Failure to provide the recommended care contributes 
to thousands of preventable deaths each year and poses a serious threat to the 
health of the American public.15 In addition, this lack of adherence wastes $260 
to $380 billion per year, more than the federal government spends on educa-
tion, housing, and transportation combined.16 Unwarranted variance in care re-
                                                        
12  Tsugawa et al., supra note 11, at 681 (demonstrating larger variation in spending across 
physicians than across hospitals and arguing that “policies that target physicians within hos-
pitals may be more effective in reducing wasteful spending than policies focusing solely on 
hospitals”); Wennberg, supra note 8, at 962 (stating patient preferences cannot explain many 
variations in practice); John E. Wennberg & Peggy Y. Thomson, Time to Tackle Unwarrant-
ed Variations in Practice, 342 BMJ 687, 687 (2011) (“[M]uch of the variation . . . is unwar-
ranted because it isn’t explained by illness or patient preference.”). But see AM. C. 
OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS OPINION NO. 629, CLINICAL GUIDELINES AND 
STANDARDIZATION OF PRACTICE TO IMPROVE OUTCOMES 1–2 (2015), available at https://ww 
w.acog.org/-/media/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Patient-Safety-and-Quality-Improv 
ement/co629.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20190401T1916341474 [https://perma.cc/8BY3-MPUR] 
[hereinafter ACOG GUIDELINE OPINION] (contrasting necessary clinical variation based on 
“age, ethnicity, weight, medical history, and desired outcome” with unwarranted variations 
in care); Matthew Mercuri & Amiram Gafni, Examining the Role of the Physician as a 
Source of Variation: Are Physician‐Related Variations Necessarily Unwarranted?, 24 J. 
EVALUATION CLINICAL PRAC. 145, 146 (2017) (describing the view that such variation is 
problematic as unsubstantiated by empirical evidence). 
13  “Our medicine is run by cowboys today, where everyone is riding the range doing what-
ever they’re wanting to do . . . . It’s a failure at all levels . . . .” describes Dr. Steven Clark, a 
professor and childbirth safety expert. Alison Young, Hospitals Know How to Protect Moth-
ers. They Just Aren’t Doing It, USA TODAY (July 27, 2018, 1:54 PM), https://www.usatoday 
.com/in-depth/news/investigations/deadly-deliveries/2018/07/26/maternal-mortality-rates-pr 
eeclampsia-postpartum-hemorrhage-safety/546889002/ [https://perma.cc/B35B-CUG8]. 
14  INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., VARIATION IN HEALTH CARE SPENDING: TARGET 
DECISION MAKING, NOT GEOGRAPHY 1–2 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 IOM REPORT] (finding 
“[u]nderuse, misuse, and overuse of various services often put patients in danger;” geograph-
ic variations in care are substantial, pervasive, and persistent over time); Isaac D. Buck, 
Overtreatment and Informed Consent: A Fraud-Based Solution to Unwanted and Unneces-
sary Care, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 901, 905, 908 (2016) (describing over $750 billion in 
wasted healthcare spending due to overtreatment and proposing civil False Claims Act en-
forcement to reduce unnecessary care). 
15  McGlynn et al., supra note 2, at 2635 (stating that failure to adhere to Guidelines “pose[s] 
serious threats to the health of the American public”); see also Health Care Quality, RAND 
CORP., http://www.rand.org/topics/health-care-quality.html [https://perma.cc/8BSA-KQSE] 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2019) (“The gap between the care patients should get and what they ac-
tually receive likely contributes to thousands of preventable deaths each year . . .”). 
16  Donald M. Berwick & Andrew D. Hackbarth, Eliminating Waste in U.S. Health Care, 
307 JAMA 1513, 1513–14 (2012) (estimating failure to follow best practices in care delivery 
wastes $102 billion to $154 billion and overtreatment wastes an additional $158 billion to 
$226 billion per year); see also Federal Spending: Where Does the Money Go, NAT’L 
PRIORITIES PROJECT, https://www.nationalpriorities.org/budget-basics/federal-budget-101/spe 
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flects serious and costly shortcomings in the decision making of physicians and 
patients.17 
II. INCREASING THE SALIENCE OF CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES COULD 
IMPROVE PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT DECISION MAKING 
A. Guidelines Recommend the Best Care Approach for Most Patients 
Clinical practice guidelines can help solve unwarranted variance in care by 
improving the decision making of physicians and patients.18 Professional rec-
ommendations regarding appropriate care have existed in one form or other as 
long as medicine has been practiced.19 The emphasis on formally adopted 
Guidelines gained more salience, however, after John Wennberg’s ground-
breaking research revealed unwarranted geographic disparities in care.20 The 
desire to ensure rational, scientifically based medical care and to contain costs 
led to increased funding of and emphasis on formal Guidelines and the compar-
ative effectiveness research upon which they rely.21 Recently, under the Af-
fordable Care Act, taxpayers made a $4 billion investment in these quality im-
provement initiatives.22 
                                                                                                                                
nding/ [https://perma.cc/M92P-34WN] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) (showing the government 
spent $102.3 billion on education, $85 billion on transportation, and $61.5 billion on housing 
and community). 
17  Many factors appear to contribute to unjustified variations in care, including lack of 
knowledge of the recommended approach, poor physician and patient decision making, poor 
care processes, misaligned payment systems, and uncoordinated care. INST. OF MED., 
CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 1–2 (2001) 
[hereinafter IOM CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM]; 2013 IOM REPORT, supra note 14, at 3–4; 
Casey, supra note 4, at 1582 (recommending the use of checklist-based algorithms); Effec-
tive Care, DARTMOUTH ATLAS HEALTH CARE, http://archive.dartmouthatlas.org/keyissues/iss 
ue.aspx?con=2939 [https://perma.cc/L7Z3-XLWK] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) [hereinafter 
Dartmouth—Effective Care]; Supply-Sensitive Care, DARTMOUTH ATLAS HEALTH CARE, 
http://archive.dartmouthatlas.org/keyissues/issue.aspx?con=2937 [https://perma.cc/48V3-LS 
3J] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) [hereinafter Dartmouth—Supply Sensitive]. 
18  Even with the substantial new investment in Comparative Effective Research and Guide-
lines over the last decade, well-developed Guidelines do not exist for many care decisions. 
Further, developing reliable scientific data to test everything that physicians do out of cus-
tom and practice is almost certainly cost prohibitive. When reliable Guidelines are unavaila-
ble, individual physician-patient decision making remains the best available approach. 
19  David M. Eddy, Practice Policies: Where Do They Come From?, 263 JAMA 1265, 1265 
(1990). 
20  John Wennberg & Alan Gittelsohn, Small Area Variations in Health Care Delivery, 182 
SCI. 1102, 1107 (1973); see also Mello, supra note 6, at 649 (recognizing the connection be-
tween Wennberg’s scholarship and emphasis on clinical practice guidelines); Wennberg, su-
pra note 8, at 964. 
21  See, e.g., Mehlman, supra note 6, at 1190–91. 
22  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-311, COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS 
RESEARCH: ACTIVITIES FUNDED BY THE PATIENT-CENTERED OUTCOMES RESEARCH TRUST 
FUND (2018) [hereinafter 2018 GAO REPORT]. 
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Comparative effectiveness research (“CER”) compares outcomes between 
existing health interventions to determine which provides the most benefit and 
least harm, in an effort to determine the most effective practices.23 CER studies 
“which standard interventions work best for whom.”24 In doing so, CER seeks 
to assist physicians, patients, and policy makers to “make informed decisions to 
improve health care.”25 Guidelines typically rely on CER to form recommenda-
tions for care.26 
The Institute of Medicine27 (“IOM”) defines clinical practice guidelines as 
“statements that include recommendations intended to optimize patient care. 
They are informed by a systematic review of evidence and an assessment of the 
benefits and harms of alternative care options.”28 Guidelines reflect the recom-
mended care approach of an expert panel, based on systematic review of empir-
ic evidence and judgments regarding the weight to give potential harms and 
benefits.29 Typically, multi-disciplinary experts draft proposed Guidelines with 
patient participation or input.30 Before Guidelines are adopted, they are peer 
reviewed and, when necessary, revised.31 If utilized effectively, Guidelines 
                                                        
23  INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., INITIAL NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR COMPARATIVE 
EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH 41 (2009) (“Comparative effectiveness research (CER) is the gen-
eration and synthesis of evidence that compares the benefits and harms of alternative meth-
ods to prevent, diagnose, treat, and monitor a clinical condition or to improve the delivery of 
care.”). 
24  Lois Shepherd, Informed Consent for Comparative Effectiveness Research Should Include 
Risks of Standard Care, 45 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 352, 352 (2017) (quoting R.R. Faden et al., 
Informed Consent, Comparative Effectiveness, and Learning Health Care, 370 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 766, 766 (2014)). 
25  2018 GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 1. 
26  INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES WE CAN TRUST 7 
(2011) [hereinafter 2011 IOM STANDARDS]. 
27  The IOM was renamed the Health and Medicine Division (“HMD”) on March 15, 2016. 
About Us, HEALTH & MED. DIVISION, www.nationalacademies.org/hmd/About-HMD [https:/ 
/perma.cc/U23T-3NBP] (last updated Jan. 16, 2018, 4:13 PM). The IOM was, and the HMD 
is, part of the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine (“National Acade-
mies”). 
The National Academies are private, nonprofit institutions that provide independent, objective 
analysis and advice to the nation and conduct other activities to solve complex problems and in-
form public policy decisions related to science, technology, and medicine. The Academies oper-
ate under an 1863 congressional charter to the National Academy of Sciences, signed by Presi-
dent Lincoln. 
Id. 
28  2011 IOM STANDARDS, supra note 26, at 25–26. 
29  Id. at 26. 
30  K. De Boeck et al., Medical Consensus, Guidelines, and Position Papers: A Policy for the 
ECFS, 13 J. CYSTIC FIBROSIS 495, 497 (2014); Murad, supra note 3, at 425. 
31  Yvonne D’Arcy, Practice Guidelines, Standards, Consensus Statements, Position Papers: 
What Are They, How They Differ, AM. NURSE TODAY (Oct. 2007), https://www.americannurs 
etoday.com/practice-guidelines-standards-consensus-statements-position-papers-what-they-a 
re-how-they-differ/ [https://perma.cc/WP6R-8Z28]. 
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have the potential to make care more scientifically-based, more rational.32 Giv-
en the magnitude of the problem with unwarranted variance in care and recent 
refinements in the quality of Guidelines, Guidelines present an enormous op-
portunity to improve healthcare in the United States.33 
Well-developed Guidelines have significant advantages over traditional, ad 
hoc physician-patient decision making.34 First, they typically provide the best 
available information.35 Guidelines stem from a systematic review of the latest 
empiric research.36 They include easily accessible summaries of up-to-date in-
formation that can help align medical decision making with evidence from 
CER.37 While some have criticized Guidelines for “freezing” a care recom-
mendation based on then-available research, this criticism is both overstated 
and largely avoidable.38 It is avoidable if Guidelines are regularly updated.39 It 
is overstated in that it ignores that individual physicians are far more likely to 
rely on outdated or incomplete information without Guidelines than with 
them.40 After all, given the volume of new studies published monthly, practic-
ing physicians cannot and do not read most of them.41 Certainly for the over-
                                                        
32  Murad, supra note 3, at 425. 
33  Id. at 431 (“Empirical evidence shows that guidelines improve patient outcomes . . . .”); 
Proietti et al., supra note 3, at 917 (concluding that guideline adherence was associated with 
lower mortality among elderly atrial fibrillation patients); Wöckel et al., supra note 3, at 125 
(discussing how less guideline adherence tracked lower survival in breast cancer patients). 
34  Countries around the world utilize Guidelines to improve quality of care. See GUIDELINES 
INT’L NETWORK, http://www.g-i-n.net [https://perma.cc/MQ8X-B4G4] (last updated Nov. 
18, 2016). 
35  Dan Bang & Chris D. Frith, Making Better Decisions in Groups, ROYAL SOC’Y OPEN SCI., 
Aug. 16, 2017, at 1, 6 (“As a statistical rule of thumb, pooling information across independ-
ent individuals leads to more reliable information.”). 
36  See NGC and NQMC Inclusion Criteria, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, http 
s://www.ahrq.gov/gam/summaries/inclusion-criteria/index.html [https://perma.cc/U4BK-HL 
Q5] (last updated Oct. 2018) [hereinafter Inclusion Criteria]. 
37  Significantly, Guidelines include recommendations as well as evidence summaries. Id. 
38  Mehlman, supra note 6, at 1209 (describing how guidelines can freeze the standard of 
care). 
39  When a physician does read of a new study that suggests a different care approach, he or 
she would also need to conduct a systematic review of all evidence in order to reach a care 
recommendation based on the same quality of information as contained in Guidelines. It 
would be grossly inefficient to encourage each individual physician to try to keep up with 
the clinical knowledgebase this way, rather than using Guidelines. 
40  This article describes out-of-date guidelines as an overstated problem in comparison to 
individual physician knowledge, but it readily acknowledges that it would be unwise to in-
crease the salience of guidelines without also ensuring adequate updating procedures. See 
infra Part IV. Studies suggest that most guidelines need to be updated every three to five 
years. See, e.g., Paul G. Shekelle et al., Validity of the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality Clinical Practice Guidelines: How Quickly Do Guidelines Become Outdated?, 286 
JAMA 1461, 1466 (2001). 
41  In fact, a study estimated that journals published “7,287 articles monthly that would need 
to be considered to comprehensively and systematically update the primary care knowledge-
base.” Brian S. Alper et al., How Much Effort is Needed to Keep Up with the Literature Rel-
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whelming majority of physicians and patients, paying more attention to Guide-
lines would considerably improve the information used to make care deci-
sions.42 
Second, Guidelines often provide superior expertise and perspective when 
compared to individual physician decision making.43 Studies show that groups 
typically have a greater number of different ideas and bring more specializa-
tions to decision making than individuals.44 Groups are also more likely to 
make rational decisions than individuals.45 Guidelines reflect these comparative 
advantages.46 They are drafted and reviewed by a group of multi-disciplinary 
experts.47 They also often benefit from representative patient input in for-
mation.48 These manifold viewpoints enable Guidelines to reflect thoughtful 
consideration of diverse perspectives and expertise. 
                                                                                                                                
evant for Primary Care?, 92 J. MED. LIBR. ASS’N 429, 433 (2004). It would take 3.6 physi-
cians reading full-time just to keep up. Id. 
42  Nothing in this proposal would prevent a physician who did have more up-to-date 
knowledge from acting on that superior information. While this article contends that physi-
cian should be required to disclose Guidelines before deviating from them, deviating remains 
cheap and easy. 
43  Bang & Frith, supra note 35, at 6 (“[S]tudies show that, by adopting the decision favoured 
by the majority of independent dermatologists, the accuracy of skin and breast cancer diag-
nosis can be improved over and above the single-best individual.”). 
44  Jeffery B. Schmidt et al., New Product Development Decision-Making Effectiveness: 
Comparing Individuals, Face-to-Face Teams, and Virtual Teams, 32 DECISION SCI. 575, 
591–92 (2001). Thus, for close to 500 years, it has been commonly accepted wisdom that 
two heads are better than one. See, e.g., JOHN HEYWOOD, A DIALOGUE CONTEINYNG THE 
NOMBER IN EFFECT OF ALL THE PROUERBES IN THE ENGLISHE TONGUE: COMPACTE IN A 
MATTER CONCERNYNG TWO MANER OF MARIAGES, MADE AND SET FOORTH (1546). On bal-
ance empiric research supports this proverb. Bang & Frith, supra note 35, at 7 (“Groups have 
been shown to outperform individuals for many problems of probability and reasoning.”). 
However, studies do also show that groups can suffer from “groupthink,” conformity pres-
sure that stifles divergent ideas. IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK 174 (2d ed. 1982). 
45  Tamar Kugler et al., Are Groups More Rational Than Individuals? A Review of Interac-
tive Decision Making in Groups, 3 WIREs COGNITIVE SCI. 471, 478 (2012). 
46  Groups tend to raise the quality of the decision making of the majority. They benefit 
equally qualified participants and lower qualified participants. They may, however, paradox-
ically lower the decision making of any superior group members. Bahador Bahrami et al., 
Optimally Interacting Minds, 329 SCI. 1081, 1084–85 (2010). 
47  Murad, supra note 3, at 425; Inclusion Criteria, supra note 36. 
48  Guidelines have improved recently as a result of increased attention to patient preferences 
and patient centered outcomes. The ACA introduced new funding for Patient-Centered Out-
come Research Institute (PCORI), and the benefits of this new emphasis are only beginning 
to be realized. 2018 GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 1–2. But see Melissa J. Armstrong & 
Joshua A. Bloom, Patient Involvement in Guidelines is Poor Five Years After Institute of 
Medicine Standards: Review of Guideline Methodologies, RES. INVOLVEMENT & 
ENGAGEMENT, Oct. 2, 2017 (showing patient and public involvement with guideline devel-
opment remains low five years after publication of 2011 IOM Standards). The new PCORI 
funding and patient focus should help ameliorate prior concerns regarding a mismatch be-
tween research measures and patient-centered outcome goals. See Mehlman, supra note 6, at 
1214–17 (highlighting concerns). 
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Third, the process of Guideline creation, peer review, and adoption allows 
for careful consideration of benefits, risks, and alternatives. This sort of slower, 
more deliberate thinking tends to be more rational and reliable than the “think-
ing fast” required by individual physicians making care recommendations in 
real time in exam rooms.49 Because Guidelines rest on a systemic review of 
empiric evidence, include collective wisdom from a group of learned experts 
and representative patients, and are formed only after a thoughtful deliberative 
process, Guidelines should reflect the best care approach for most patients most 
of the time.50 
While skeptics often compare Guidelines to perfect decision making high-
lighting shortcomings, such analysis is inapposite.51 The alternative to Guide-
line adherence is not an idealized decision making process⎯it is decidedly 
more flawed ad hoc individual physician and patient decision making.52 When 
evaluating the importance and value of Guidelines, the proper question is not 
whether Guidelines have challenges, but whether or not Guidelines can im-
prove decision making vis a vis physicians and patients alone.53 The answer is 
clearly yes.54 
                                                        
49  DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 28, 79 (2011) (discussing how time pres-
sure and unfamiliarity make heuristic mistakes more likely); Evangelia Tsiga et al., The In-
fluence of Time Pressure on Adherence to Guidelines in Primary Care: An Experimental 
Study, 3 BMJ OPEN 1, 1 (2013) (finding “most medical decisions are taken in a context of 
pressure and uncertainty” and suggesting that “experts use intuitive decision-making strate-
gies rather than structured approaches.”). 
50  2011 IOM STANDARDS: REPORT BRIEF, supra note 3, at 1, 4 (showing guidelines optimize 
care by providing the information necessary for “selecting the best care for a unique patient 
based on his or her preferences” and “aid clinicians and patients alike in determining the best 
treatment options”); Murad, supra note 3, at 431 (“Empirical evidence shows that guidelines 
improve patient outcomes . . .”); see also Fritz et al., supra note 3 (concluding adherence to 
guideline for low back pain leads to better clinical outcomes and lower costs); Hepner et al., 
supra note 3 (finding that guideline adherence in depression care is linked to better out-
comes); Proietti et al., supra note 3 (concluding that guideline adherence was associated with 
lower mortality among elderly atrial fibrillation patients); Wilke et al., supra note 3, at 315, 
321 (finding that guidelines for pneumonia saved lives, money, and were overall superior); 
Willis et al., supra note 3 (finding that guidelines for the management of pediatric compli-
cated appendicitis improved patient outcomes); Wöckel et al., supra note 3 (finding less 
guideline adherence tracked lower survival in breast cancer patients); Woods-Hill et al., su-
pra note 3 (finding guidelines improve laboratory results for critically ill children). But see 
Boyd et al., supra note 3, at 720 (finding that guidelines did not provide the best care for el-
derly patients with comorbidity). 
51  To be clear, these criticisms can be very useful in helping Guidelines to develop and im-
prove. It is only when they are used to justify discounting or underfunding Guidelines that 
they merit reconsideration. 
52  Noah, supra note 7, at 698 (highlighting “necessary fallibility” in physician-patient deci-
sion making). 
53  One common criticism of Guidelines is that committees form them based on empiric evi-
dence from studies that have very narrow participation criteria, typically eliminating patients 
with co-morbidities or other complicating factors. This creates challenges when applying 
Guidelines in the real world where patients often present with multiple medical issues that 
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B. Physician Decision Making Suffers from Structural Limitations and 
Cognitive Biases 
The comparative strength of Guidelines contrasts with systematic short-
comings in physician and patient decision making. Despite being held in high 
regard, as compared to Guidelines, physician decision making suffers from 
lower quality information, fewer viewpoints, time pressure, and cognitive bias-
es.55 Patients receive recommended care only half of the time.56 As a result of 
practice constraints, when physicians make care recommendations, they typi-
cally do so in a matter of seconds or minutes, without research, and without 
                                                                                                                                
may need to be factored into the determination of appropriate care. The ACA provides new 
funds to begin addressing this concern, and the proposed remedy intentionally allows cheap 
and easy deviations from Guidelines when physicians have a rational basis to recommend a 
different care approach. 2018 GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 1. However, given the magni-
tude and cost of the current problem with unjustified variances in care, the need for patient 
differentiation should not be overstated nor should physicians disregard Guideline recom-
mendations lightly. 
54  Guideline criticisms relating to bias or conflict of interest illustrate this point. Some 
Guidelines skeptics point out that there is seldom wholly impartial funding for the creation 
of Guidelines. See, e.g., Mehlman, supra note 6, at 1214. While often true, there are still 
several reasons to believe that Guidelines are less likely to be biased or suffer conflicts of 
interest than an individual physician’s recommendation. First, Guidelines must be based on a 
systematic review of empiric evidence. Inclusion Criteria, supra note 36. In contrast, an in-
dividual physician typically supplies no evidence to support his or her recommendation. 
Second, Guidelines are also formed by multi-disciplinary panels, which tend to combat bias 
and discrimination better than individuals. Bang & Frith, supra note 35, at 7 (“While our 
own biases are often hidden from ourselves, we are remarkably good at detecting others’ bi-
ases.”). In individual physician decision making, there is no such check on the individual’s 
biases. Third, an individual physician often has a direct personal financial interest in a care 
recommendation given. Multi-disciplinary panelists may have some financial interest in 
Guidelines, but that interest is usually far more attenuated than the individual physicians’. 
Moreover, diverse panelists would tend to have diverse interests, and as a result, the final 
Guideline recommendation should be less subject to special interest capture than any one 
individual. So, while imperfect, Guidelines should be markedly better on average than indi-
vidual physicians at combatting bias or conflict of interest. 
55  Tsiga et al., supra note 49, at 1 (stating most medical decisions are made under time pres-
sure). While this article highlights flaws in physician decision making, it is written with the 
utmost respect for physicians, the work that they do, and the effort they expend trying to 
make the best possible healthcare recommendations. We are all human and all utilize heuris-
tics. So, illustrating these intuitive rather than rational decision making strategies is not in-
tended as criticism, only as necessary empiric evidence that greater deference to scientifical-
ly based, carefully considered, consensus recommendations is warranted. Physicians also 
predominantly create the very Guidelines that this article suggests deserve increased promi-
nence. 
56  McGlynn et al., supra note 2, at 2641–42. This is a fairly crude statistic, and the exact 
percentage of variances that are neither clinically supported nor based on patient preference 
may be lower. Nonetheless, it is overwhelmingly clear that the percentage of patients who 
are over-treated, undertreated or mistreated is far too high. 
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consultation with anyone other than, at times, the patient.57 While individual 
physician decision making varies both by physician and by circumstance, in 
general, it lacks the reliability of Guidelines.58 
The first shortcoming of physician decision making, at least as compared to 
Guidelines, stems from inferior information. As discussed above, physicians 
typically are not, and realistically cannot be, familiar with all of the latest em-
piric evidence bearing on care.59 In fact, studies show that physicians have at 
least one question for every two patients that they see and leave roughly two-
thirds of these questions unanswered.60 So, when they make a recommendation, 
it is not usually based on the best available data.61 
Even if familiar with the latest research, individual physician decision 
making lacks the benefit of a slower deliberative process and multiple view-
points.62 To be successful, physicians must learn to make care decisions quick-
ly and without collaboration with other experts.63 While perhaps necessary, the 
speed and isolation of individual physician decision making render mistakes 
more likely.64 
                                                        
57  Tsiga et al., supra note 49, at 1 (stating most medical decisions are made under time pres-
sure). 
58  Studies show that many factors such as gender, experience, and training impact individual 
physician decision making. See, e.g., Karen E. Lutfey et al., Physician Cognitive Processing 
as a Source of Diagnostic and Treatment Disparities in Coronary Heart Disease: Results of 
a Factorial Priming Experiment, 51 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 16, 22 (2010) (finding that 
physician gender and level of experience influence clinical decision making); see also Daniel 
Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1449, 1469 (2003) (“What is natural and intuitive in a given situation is not the 
same for everyone . . . .”). 
59  Alper et al., supra note 41, at 436. 
60  Guilherme Del Fiol et al., Clinical Questions Raised by Clinicians at the Point of Care: A 
Systematic Review, 174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 710, 710, 712, 715–16 (2014) (“Unanswered 
questions may lead to suboptimal patient care decisions.”). 
61  As discussed below, many physicians also lack knowledge or familiarity with Guidelines. 
62  Casey, supra note 4, at 1582 (identifying under-adherence with Guidelines as possibly 
explained by reduced time for “detailed, systematic, and, hence, consistent evaluation and 
treatment”); Tsiga et al., supra note 49, at 1 (discussing that most medical decisions are 
made under time pressure). 
63  Physicians also poorly predict patient preferences in on the spot care decisions. Benjamin 
Moulton & Jaime S. King, Aligning Ethics with Medical Decision-Making: The Quest for 
Informed Patient Choice, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 85, 89–90 (2010) (stating how studies show 
wide variation in patient preferences and that physicians predict such variation poorly). 
64  Tsiga et al., supra note 49, at 3–5 (stating time pressure and uncertainty make physician 
heuristic mistakes more common). At the same time, heuristics like overconfidence can 
cause physicians “to spend insufficient time accumulating evidence and synthesizing it be-
fore action.” Pat Croskerry, Achieving Quality in Clinical Decision Making: Cognitive Strat-
egies and Detection of Bias, 9 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 1184, 1193 (2002). 
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The complexity, uncertainty, and time pressure of physician decision mak-
ing creates an environment where cognitive bias thrives.65 Cognitive biases are 
systematic errors in judgment; they illustrate how actual human decision mak-
ing differs from rational-agent models.66 Rational-agent models assume that 
people will weigh the costs and benefits of their choices based on the infor-
mation available to them and pick the choice that maximizes expected utility.67 
Behavioral economists have shown that these models often fail to predict actual 
human behavior.68 Humans’ ability to make rational decisions is limited by the 
complexity, novelty and costs of the decision, the cognitive limits of their 
minds, and the time available to decide.69 
Real decision makers are not purely or perhaps even predominantly ration-
al.70 They make decisions using two systems simultaneously, System 1 and 
System 2.71 System 1 is an “automatic mode” that involves fast thinking “with 
little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control.”72 System 2 is an “effortful 
mode” that requires slower thinking and attention and is used for complex rea-
soning.73 System 1 suffers from biases and error-prone heuristics, rule of thumb 
shortcuts.74 System 2 is more rational, but also slower, effortful, and of limited 
capacity.75 To conserve effort and optimize performance, System 1 and System 
2 regularly interact. System 1 continuously and unconsciously generates sug-
gestions that System 2 either endorses or rejects.76 System 1 “cannot be turned 
                                                        
65  Croskerry, supra note 64, at 1192; Greaney, supra note 7, at 1194–95 (showing limited 
information and complexity tend to increase cognitive bias; bias “is endemic in health care 
decisionmaking”); Noah, supra note 7, at 701–02 (“both physicians and patients also regu-
larly employ biases and heuristic shortcuts . . . .”); see also KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 36, 
79, 85. Some Guideline skeptics point to the intractable uncertainty of medicine to discount 
Guidelines, but such uncertainty is one of the reasons Guidelines are so important. When 
faced with uncertainty, decision making is more likely to reflect heuristics and biases. 
66  See Kahneman, supra note 58, at 1449 (describing the “systematic biases that separate the 
beliefs that people have and the choices they make from the optimal beliefs and choices as-
sumed in rational-agent models”); see also KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 7. 
67  Kahneman, supra note 58, at 1459. 
68  Id. 
69  See generally KAHNEMAN, supra note 49; Judith H. Hibbard & Ellen Peters, Supporting 
Informed Consumer Health Care Decisions: Data Presentation Approaches that Facilitate 
the Use of Information in Choice, 24 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 413, 415 (2003) (recognizing 
increased use of heuristics when information is complex or requires comparisons on multiple 
variables). 
70  Greaney, supra note 7, at 1194–95; Kahneman, supra note 58, at 1469. 
71  KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 24. We are not conscious of System 1, which operates au-
tomatically and too quickly for awareness. 
72  Id. at 20. 
73  Id. at 21. 
74  System 1 “sometimes answers easier questions than the one it was asked,” without the 
person realizing that this substitution has occurred. Id. at 25. Use of heuristics simplifies 
choice but compromises accuracy. It leads to predictable mistakes. Id. 
75  Id. at 21, 25, 35. 
76  Id. at 25. 
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off[,]” nor should it be.77 People need System 1 because System 2 would be 
overwhelmed if asked to make all decisions.78 When decisions must be made 
quickly, are unfamiliar, or involve uncertainty, System 1 plays a larger role in 
decision making and, as a result, these choices reflect biases and heuristics 
more often.79 
Physicians tend to be highly educated, hard-working, well-intended deci-
sion makers, but they are still human. As humans, their decision making re-
mains subject to cognitive biases.80 Accordingly, when they face complex, 
novel, and uncertain decisions, with limited information and time, like which 
health care alternative has fewer risks and more benefits for a particular patient, 
they may rely more on their automatic system when deciding, rather than the 
more deliberate and rational System⎯System 2.81 This predictably increases 
the risk of biases and systematic errors in decision making.82 
Medical scholars have catalogued thirty biases or failed heuristics that im-
pair physician decision making.83 This Article uses three to illustrate common, 
but unconscious, mistakes in physician decision making: status quo bias, over-
confidence bias, and availability bias.84 
Status quo bias refers to the natural tendency to approach a problem the 
same way one has in the past, even after receiving information that suggests a 
new approach would be better.85 The status quo serves as a “default” and is 
“sticky,” meaning people will continue to follow it even when a purely rational 
decision maker would use the new information to update their beliefs about the 
                                                        
77  Id. 
78  Id. at 35; Bang & Frith, supra note 35, at 14 (“Biases are the reality of our cognitive sys-
tem. It is the cost we pay for efficiency.”). 
79  See KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 79. 
80  Noah, supra note 7, at 701–02; see also Kahneman, supra note 58, at 1469. 
81  KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 105; Jessica S. Ancker & David Kaufman, Rethinking 
Health Numeracy: A Multidisciplinary Literature Review, 14 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS 
ASS’N 713, 715 (2007) (“[T]ime pressures can cause people to base decisions on rapid and 
automatic affective responses”); J.S. Blumenthal-Barby & Hadley Burroughs, Seeking Better 
Health Care Outcomes: The Ethics of Using the “Nudge”, 12 AM. J. BIOETHICS 1, 1 (2012) 
(stating how behavioral economics explains how “decision making [is] flawed and biased in 
predictable ways”); Greaney, supra note 7, at 1194–95; Mantel, supra note 7, at 479–81. 
82  Greaney, supra note 7, at 1197–99; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 7, at 1085; see also 
Mantel, supra note 7, at 480–84. 
83  Croskerry, supra note 64, at 1186. 
84  This article highlights cognitive mistakes in individual physician decision making to 
demonstrate why Guidelines should be elevated in medical decision making, but as com-
pared to patients, physicians likely have fewer cognitive errors. As experts with skill and ex-
perience, physicians on balance make fewer heuristic mistakes. KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, 
at 11. 
85  William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. 
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1988). 
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best approach.86 Physicians appear to suffer from “status quo bias.”87 As a re-
sult, physicians often recommend the same care they have in the past, even af-
ter empiric evidence indicates that another alternative is more beneficial or less 
risky.88 Adopting a new method takes more cognitive work and does not intui-
tively feel right, even when rationally it is the superior course. Status quo bias 
can be so strong that “it takes an average of 17 years for evidence from ran-
domized clinical trials to be incorporated into practice . . .”89 
Stent implantation illustrates this problem.90 By 2007, clinical trials had re-
vealed that stents neither prevent heart attacks nor extend lives in stable pa-
tients.91 Because “one in [fifty patients] will suffer a serious complication or 
die as a result of the implantation procedure[,]” the evidence indicated that im-
planting stents not only lacked benefit but also unjustifiably risked serious 
harm.92 An updated Guideline followed by 2011.93 Nonetheless, five years lat-
                                                        
86  This problem can be especially common when considering more than two treatment op-
tions. Croskerry, supra note 64, at 1192 (“[M]ultiple alternatives bias,” a variant of status 
quo bias, suggests that if there are more than two care options, physicians will be even more 
likely to stick with the status quo); Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Using Behavioral Economics to 
Design Physician Incentives that Deliver High-Value Care, 164 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 
114, 115 (2016) (describing how “[c]hoice [o]verload” can reinforce status quo bias for phy-
sicians); In medical literature, a contradicted claim can continue to persist in citations for a 
decade after being disproven. See Athina Tatsioni et al., Persistence of Contradicted Claims 
in the Literature, 298 JAMA 2517 (2007). 
87  Bang & Frith, supra note 35, at 2 (describing physician performance of tonsillectomies 
decades after evidence showed such procedures were ineffective); Croskerry, supra note 64, 
at 1192; Greaney, supra note 7, at 1197–98 (discussing how physicians exhibit status quo 
bias, continuing a practice even after knowledge of peer-reviewed literature demonstrating a 
better care approach). 
88  Bang & Frith, supra note 35, at 2; Cabana et al., supra note 4, at 1458, 1462; Richard G. 
Frank, Behavioral Economics and Health Economics, in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND ITS 
APPLICATIONS 195, 199 (Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2007) (noting physician 
have been slow to adopt effective drugs like beta blockers and to switch to prescribing ge-
nerics despite compelling evidence); Greaney, supra note 7, at 1198; Sandra H. Johnson, 
Polluting Medical Judgment? False Assumptions in the Pursuit of False Claims Regarding 
Off-Label Prescribing, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 74–82 (2008) (describing how physi-
cians continue to rely on habit even when the practice is contrary to peer-reviewed literature 
raising serious safety concerns). 
89  Casey, supra note 4, at 1581. This lag time may also reflect confirmation bias. 
90  David Epstein & ProPublica, When Evidence Says No, but Doctors Say Yes, ATLANTIC 
(Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/02/when-evidence-says-no 
-but-doctors-say-yes/517368/ [https://perma.cc/BRM9-RZNS]; see also Epstein, supra note 
6, at 1311 (discussing stents as an example where physician reliance on custom and practice 
rather than data undermines the quality of care). 
91  William E. Boden et al., Optimal Medical Therapy with or without PCI for Stable Coro-
nary Disease, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1503, 1504 (2007); see also Kathleen Stergiopoulos & 
David L. Brown, Initial Coronary Stent Implantation with Medical Therapy vs Medical 
Therapy Alone for Stable Coronary Artery Disease: Meta-Analysis of Randomized Con-
trolled Trials, 172 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 312 (2012) (stating that later systematic review 
of clinical trials on stent implantation reconfirming lack of benefit). 
92  Epstein & ProPublica, supra note 90. 
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er, nearly half of all stents implanted in stable patients were still inappropri-
ate.94 Despite strong evidence and significant risk of serious harm, many physi-
cians continued to follow outdated implantation practices.95 Status quo bias im-
pedes physicians from quickly integrating innovation into practice, often at 
great cost.96 
“Overconfidence bias” may also impair physician decision making.97 This 
bias reflects the reality that people often think they know more than they actu-
ally do and place far too much confidence in their own opinions and skills.98 
Overconfidence bias appears to be endemic in medicine.99 In fact, in a study 
comparing autopsy results with diagnosis, physicians who were “completely 
certain” of their diagnosis turned out to be completely wrong 40 percent of the 
time.100 Overconfidence leads to unwarranted care variances because when 
physicians systematically overestimate their own knowledge and skill, they are 
substantially less likely to change care recommendation in response to evidence 
                                                                                                                                
93  Glenn N. Levine et al., 2011 ACCF/AHA/SCAI Guideline for Percutaneous Coronary In-
tervention, 58 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY e44, e48, e91 (2011). 
94  Frederick A. Masoudi et al., Trends in U.S. Cardiovascular Care: 2016 Report from 4 
ACC National Cardiovascular Data Registries, 69 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 1427, 1433, 1436 
(2017) (stating, even after the new guideline, half of stents implanted in stable patients were 
definitely or possibly inappropriate). 
95  Over-implantation of stents also almost certainly reflects physician commission bias. 
Commission bias makes humans want to take action once a problem has been identified, 
even if no action would be more likely to maximize utility. See, e.g., Ian Scott, Errors in 
Clinical Reasoning: Causes and Remedial Strategies, 339 BMJ 22, 24 (2009) (describing 
commission bias as the “[t]endency to do something . . . even if intended actions are not sup-
ported by robust evidence and may in fact do harm”). It also likely reflects confirmation bi-
as. 
96  While innovation usually eventually trickles into custom and practice, the proposed reme-
dy would speed this process by improving physician education and by nudging physician 
decision making, thus improving the quality of care. 
97  KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 262–63 (explaining that emotional, cognitive, economic, 
and social pressures all contribute to physician overconfidence); Bang & Frith, supra note 
35, at 1; Eta S. Berner & Mark L. Graber, Overconfidence as a Cause of Diagnostic Error in 
Medicine, 121 AM. J. MED. S2, S2 (2008); Croskerry, supra note 64, at 1193; Pat Croskerry 
& Geoff Norman, Overconfidence in Clinical Decision Making, 121 AM. J. MED. S24, S24 
(2008) (stating overconfidence is one of the most significant cognitive biases in physician 
decision making); Greaney, supra note 7, at 1197. 
98  KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 260–63. 
99  Id. at 263 (describing how social, economic, cognitive and emotional factors lead physi-
cians to overconfidence); Croskerry & Norman, supra note 97, at S27 (describing physician 
overconfidence as common, part of the culture of medicine). 
100  KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 263 (discussing how, perversely, patients and organiza-
tions tend to prefer confident physicians; recognizing uncertainty is frowned upon). An ex-
ample of this bias outside medicine is that 93 percent of people report that they are “above 
average” drivers. Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our Fellow 
Drivers?, 47 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 146 (1981). Of course, almost half of them are 
wrong. 
19 NEV. L.J. 867, ALEXANDER 5/27/2019  2:27 PM 
884 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:3  
 
of a better approach.101 When overconfidence bias interacts with status quo bi-
as, the effect is compounded, and physicians may find it very challenging to 
respond rationally to CER or Guidelines that suggest a different treatment 
method would improve care.102 
Physicians may also experience an “availability bias.”103 This bias refers to 
the tendency to overestimate the significance of information or experiences that 
readily come to mind.104 The evidence that is the most “available” is mistaken 
for being the most “relevant.”105 In physicians, this means that they may over-
value the significance of their recent or dramatic clinical experience in decision 
making and under-appreciate more scientifically sound, empiric research on a 
broader population.106 So, for example, when a physician’s last three patients 
failed to respond to smoking cessation counseling, the physician may stop 
counseling smokers because he or she considers it fruitless.107 The physician 
may do so despite knowledge of empiric evidence from large, well-controlled 
public health studies that physician-led smoking cessation counseling material-
ly improves the chances that a patient will stop smoking.108 The empiric evi-
dence simply does not resonate the way the physician’s own available experi-
ences do.109 Especially when coupled with overconfidence bias, this can cause 
physicians to subconsciously discount evidence of the best care recommenda-
                                                        
101  Bang & Frith, supra note 35, at 4–5; Croskerry, supra note 64, at 1193 (“Overconfidence 
may result in significant errors of both omission and commission and result in unwarranted 
interventions, costly delays, or missed diagnoses.”); Croskerry & Norman, supra note 97, at 
S27. 
102  Unfortunately, these unconscious, cognitive biases may also be reinforced by a more 
conscience risk/benefit analysis that under the current malpractice system acting consistent 
with prior practice is safer, at least when such prior practice reflects the customary approach. 
See Michael Frakes, The Impact of Medical Liability Standards on Regional Variations in 
Physician Behavior: Evidence from the Adoption of National-Standard Rules, 103 AM. 
ECON. REV. 257, 275–76 (2013) (concluding that malpractice law may discourage physician 
deviations from customary practice). 
103  Croskerry, supra note 64, at 1187; Greaney, supra note 7, at 1198–99; Korobkin & Ulen, 
supra note 7, at 1090 (recognizing the distorting impact of the availability heuristic on phy-
sician decision making); Tsiga et al., supra note 49, at 4. 
104  See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging 
Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973). 
105  Id. 
106  KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 130 (stating personal experience tends to be more availa-
ble than statistical evidence); see also id. at 249 (“ ‘Pallid’ statistical information is routinely 
discarded when it is incompatible with one’s personal impressions of a case.”). 
107  See Tsiga et al., supra note 49, at 4. 
108  See McGlynn et al., supra note 2, at 2641 (counseling has the lowest rates of adherence). 
109  KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 111 (showing small sample size bias causes humans to 
suggest a more coherent explanation for extreme outcomes when none in fact exists); see 
also id. at 130, 249 (recognizing common physician error of viewing patient as exception or 
unique, ignoring evidence to the contrary). 
19 NEV. L.J. 867, ALEXANDER 5/27/2019  2:27 PM 
Spring 2019] DISCLOSING DEVIATIONS 885 
 
tion. These and other cognitive biases undermine purely rational decision mak-
ing in even the best-intended physicians.110 
Given the risk of cognitive bias in physician decision making, critics of 
Guidelines who favor a more individualized care approach may want to recon-
sider. It is true that individuals with the same diagnosis can and do respond dif-
ferently to the same care.111 However, if there is a predictable basis for such re-
sponse, it should be reflected in the Guidelines.112 If there is not an established 
basis to predict which individual will respond differently, evidence demon-
strates that most patients will benefit from following Guideline recommenda-
tions.113 While physicians should remain free to deviate from Guidelines based 
on professional judgment, they should exercise that discretion far more cau-
tiously. After all, evidence suggests that physicians overestimate their ability to 
personalize care appropriately and cognitive biases mislead physicians regard-
ing the significance of their clinical experiences and personal impressions.114 
C. Patient Decision Making Suffers from Lack of Understanding and 
Cognitive Biases 
Having shown how physician decision making suffers from imperfect in-
formation, limited time and perspective, and cognitive biases, it is worth exam-
ining how these same factors impact patient decision making. Unsurprisingly, 
similar weaknesses exist.115 These shortcomings are greatly compounded in pa-
                                                        
110  There may be ways that physicians can counter cognitive biases. This article suggests 
using Guideline recommendations as defaults for care and discussing as well as documenting 
any reason for deviating from Guidelines. For other suggestions, see, for example, Crosker-
ry, supra note 64, at 1187. 
111  See, e.g., Daniel C. Malone et al., The Good, the Bad, and the Different: A Primer on 
Aspects of Heterogeneity of Treatment Effects, 20 J. MANAGED CARE PHARMACY 555, 555–
56 (2014). 
112  The next generation of guidelines will likely include more nuanced recommendations 
based on reliable individualized risk prediction and response to therapy estimates. David M. 
Eddy et al., Individualized Guidelines: The Potential for Increasing Quality and Reducing 
Costs, 154 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 627, 633 (2011) (stating individualized guidelines, ap-
plying readily available characteristics in a scientific way, increased quality and reduced cost 
in the context of blood pressure management); Murad, supra note 3, at 429. 
113  KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 249; Murad, supra note 3, at 431 (“Empirical evidence 
shows that guidelines improve patient outcomes . . . .”). 
114  KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 111, 130, 249, 263. While this article highlights biases and 
failed heuristics, under circumstances involving a regular environment and prolonged prac-
tice, physician’s System 1 intuitive decision making can be accurate. Id. at 11, 185, 240–41. 
The challenge, of course, is that too often physician decisions are not made in this sort of 
environment. This insight does, however, help to explain why physicians who perform a sin-
gle procedure hundreds or even thousands of times a year have substantially better outcome 
statistics than physicians who perform the same procedure infrequently. 
115  Epstein, supra note 6, at 1274–85 (providing an excellent analysis of how patients suffer 
from decision making bias and lack stable preferences). 
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tients, however, by lack of understanding and the novelty and stress of medical 
decision making.116 
Turning first to information, patients receive most of the information they 
use to make care decisions from their individual physician.117 As such, physi-
cians pass down any deficiency in information to their patients.118 Unfortunate-
ly, physicians also tend to exacerbate information insufficiencies because they 
often fail to convey important information they do have to patients.119 Physi-
cians underestimate the information patients desire and also face time pressures 
in conveying information.120 
Patients in turn make these information inadequacies worse because they 
frequently fail to understand the information their physicians do provide.121 
Conveying information does not ensure comprehension, and evidence suggests 
that patients routinely have trouble absorbing medical information.122 In fact, 
the United States reports widespread prevalence of low health literacy.123 The 
Institute of Medicine defines health literacy as “the degree to which individuals 
have the capacity to obtain, process, and understand basic health information 
                                                        
116  Ada C. Stefanescu Schmidt et al., Boundedly Rational Patients? Part 1: Health and Pa-
tient Mistakes in a Behavioral Framework, 1 J. BEHAV. ECON. FOR POL’Y 11, 11 (2017).  
117  Interestingly, the Internet has greatly increased the number of patients who seek infor-
mation independently. See, e.g., Jessica Berg, The E-Health Revolution and the Necessary 
Evolution of Informed Consent, 11 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 589, 589, 595 (2014) (“80 percent 
of US internet users have searched for [medical] information online[;]” arguing that ethical 
and legal evaluation of informed consent need to catch up to the e-health revolution) (quot-
ing Lygeia Ricciardi et al., A National Action Plan to Support Consumer Engagement Via E-
Health, 32 HEALTH AFF. 376, 378 (2013)). However, such searches tend to supplement ra-
ther than supplant physician disclosures. Most patients lack the knowledge, education, and 
experience necessary to conduct effective medical research, and many also lack access to the 
necessary databases. 
118  Scholars have long recognized the information asymmetry between physician and pa-
tient, but the information asymmetry between individual physicians and Guidelines merits 
more attention. See, e.g., Greaney, supra note 7, at 1191 (describing physician-patient in-
formation asymmetry). 
119  Moulton & King, supra note 63, at 87, 89–90 (demonstrating how studies show a “con-
sistent pattern of inadequate information disclosure”). 
120  Id. at 85 (“most physicians still undervalue disclosure”); Tsiga et al., supra note 49, at 4. 
121  INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., HEALTH LITERACY: A PRESCRIPTION TO END 
CONFUSION 1–2 (2004) [hereinafter HEALTH LITERACY]; Fact Sheet: Health Literacy Basics, 
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://health.gov/communication/literacy/quickguide/fa 
ctsbasic.htm [https://perma.cc/5AXX-3JCN] (last visited Apr. 2, 2019) [hereinafter Literacy 
Basics]; see also Thaddeus Mason Pope, Certified Patient Decision Aids: Solving Persistent 
Problems with Informed Consent Law, 45 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 12, 17 (2017) (discussing how 
patients often do not understand the information disclosed). 
122  Pope, supra note 121, at 17. 
123  Literacy Basics, supra note 121 (“[o]nly 12 percent of adults have Proficient health liter-
acy”). 
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and services needed to make appropriate health decisions.”124 Nearly half of all 
adults lack the health literacy necessary to make appropriate health deci-
sions.125 
Even those patients with above average health literacy may be missing crit-
ical points.126 90 percent of patients report that they are not able to grasp some 
health information provided to them.127 In particular, patients lack numeracy 
and the ability to process comparative risks and benefits data.128 So, due to in-
adequate information provided to patients and to gaps in understanding, the in-
formation patients actually utilize for medical decision making is demonstrably 
less reliable than the information underlying Guidelines. 
Limited time and viewpoint likewise weaken patient decision making. Pa-
tients, like physicians, typically (although not always) make healthcare deci-
sions on the spot, without more time to think slowly and critically. Quick deci-
sion making can impair decision making results.129 
Similarly, traditional physician-patient decision making lacks the diversity 
of perspectives and expertise provided by the panels that draft Guidelines. The 
only voice of experience and expertise patients receive, if any, is their individu-
al physician’s, whose view may be weakened by lack of research and time to 
reflect, as well as cognitive biases.130 The richness of thoughtfully considered, 
multi-disciplinary perspectives and the rationality of empirically based recom-
                                                        
124  HEALTH LITERACY, supra note 121, at 2; see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act of 2010, 42 U.S.C. § 295p(21) (2012) (“The term ‘health literacy’ means the degree to 
which an individual has the capacity to obtain, communicate, process, and understand health 
information and services in order to make appropriate health decisions.”). Many factors can 
impact health literacy, such as education, culture, language, and cognitive ability of the pa-
tient or how well the provider conveys the information. 
125  HEALTH LITERACY, supra note 121, at 1. 
126  Literacy Basics, supra note 121. 
127  Id. (“[N]early nine out of ten adults may lack the skills needed to manage their health 
and prevent disease.”). 
128  Ancker & Kaufman, supra note 81, at 713, 715 (“[M]any patients get lost in numbers 
. . .” and “[m]any patients lack basic probability skills . . . .”); Epstein, supra note 6, at 1283–
84 (discussing how patients struggle with numeracy, exacerbating cognitive biases); Hibbard 
& Peters, supra note 69, at 415–16; Russell Korobkin, Comparative Effectiveness Research 
as Choice Architecture: The Behavioral Law and Economics Solution to the Health Care 
Cost Crisis, 112 MICH. L. REV. 523, 540 (2014) (discussing how cognitive bias heavily in-
fluences patient decision making because patients struggle to process complex, novel, com-
parative information); Ellen Peters et al., Numeracy Skill and the Communication, Compre-
hension, and Use of Risk-Benefit Information, 26 HEALTH AFF. 741 (2007) (stating many 
patients cannot perform the basic numeric tasks required to make health care decisions effec-
tively); Lisa M. Schwartz et al., The Role of Numeracy in Understanding the Benefit of 
Screening Mammography, 127 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 966, 969 (1997) (showing only 16 
percent of women demonstrated numeracy; most did not accurately apply information about 
risks and benefits of mammography). 
129  KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 79. 
130  See supra Section II.B; see also infra Section III.B. 
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mendations are simply missing from the traditional individual physician-patient 
process. 
Given limited time and the complicated, stressful, and novel nature of pa-
tient decision making, cognitive bias also flourishes.131 Scholars have identified 
numerous biases and heuristics that distort patient choice.132 This Article se-
lects three to exemplify how patient decision making predictably and systemat-
ically reflects mistakes and biases: framing effects, single factor bias, and au-
thority bias. 
First, patients suffer from framing effects.133 This means that their decision 
will often be swayed by how physicians present information, rather than an ob-
jective analysis of that information.134 An example of this bias is that patients 
are more likely to pick a care approach if its risks are described as “9 out of 10 
patients recover” rather than “1 out of 10 patients die.”135 Rationally, the treat-
ment has the same odds under either description, but the different descriptions 
trigger different responses.136 Because patients struggle with numeracy and 
tend to be loss averse, inconsequential variations in description can determine 
preference.137 
Patients may also suffer from single factor or “lexicographic” bias, in 
which they make healthcare decisions based on one factor, ignoring all other 
variables, to simplify the decision.138 For example, a low risk patient who has 
been treated for breast cancer in one breast may focus only on decreasing the 
risk of future breast cancer when opting for a prophylactic double mastecto-
                                                        
131  Hibbard & Peters; supra note 69, at 415–16; Schmidt, et al., supra note 116, at 11–13; 
Daniel Young, Curing What Ails Us: How the Lessons of Behavioral Economics Can Im-
prove Health Care Markets, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 461, 467–68 (2012) (showing pa-
tients’ “abilities to make ‘rational’ choices are predictably constrained, especially in situa-
tions involving complex calculations and probabilistic trade-offs.”). 
132  See Epstein, supra note 6, at 1281 (using behavioral economics to describe systematic 
and predictable flaws in patient decision making); Korobkin, supra note 128, at 540; Noah, 
supra note 7, at 701–02. 
133  Epstein, supra note 6, at 1276–77 (discussing how patient preferences may be construct-
ed by frames); Greaney, supra note 7, at 1195 (recognizing the impact of framing effects); 
Korobkin, supra note 128, at 534–35 (discussing that preference may be constructed in re-
sponse to context, especially for novel decisions like healthcare). 
134  Kahneman, supra note 58, at 1458; Ada C. Stefanescu Schmidt et al., Boundedly Ration-
al Patients? Part 2: Health and Patient Mistakes in a Behavioral Framework, 1 J. BEHAV. 
ECON. FOR POL’Y 17, 20 (2017). 
135  See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 6, at 1276 (describing similar interplay between loss aver-
sion and framing effects on patients). 
136  See Kahneman, supra note 58, at 1458. 
137  Needless to say, the fact that patient decision making may turn on phrasing raises serious 
concerns. Framing effects in literature can also influence physician decision making. 
138  Korobkin, supra note 128, at 533–34 (describing lexicographic decision making in pa-
tients, especially when faced with the complex and multivariable healthcare decisions); see 
also Hibbard & Peters, supra note 69, at 416 (patients facing burdensome cognitive process-
es like risk and benefit trade-offs may rely on shortcuts like using a single factor to decide). 
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my.139 This single factor focus may ignore increased aggregate risks of an inva-
sive surgery. Aggregate risks include far more common but less available risks 
like infection, bleeding, and psychological side effects.140 By focusing on a sin-
gle factor, the patient simplifies decision making but at times at the cost of ac-
curacy.141 
Many patients also experience authority bias.142 This bias causes them to 
attribute accuracy to their individual physician’s recommendation, independent 
of its merit.143 It leads patients to over-estimate the validity of their physician’s 
recommendation, and it is one explanation for patients’ frequent deference to 
physicians’ recommendations.144 Authority bias encourages patients to simplify 
choice by relying on physicians’ recommendations.145 
In summary, patients are often overwhelmed by medical information they 
struggle to understand. They lack numeracy and, in particular, have trouble 
comprehending probabilities, which are necessary to evaluate risk and benefit 
information.146 Even aside from probabilities, they struggle with evaluability 
itself and poorly differentiate acceptable from unusual risks.147 Patients floun-
der when asked to apply different weights to several variables across multiple 
options.148 This sort of novel and complex decision making strains and often 
exceeds patients’ cognitive capacity.149 As a result, patients commonly employ 
                                                        
139  This example is intended to help explain single factor bias but not to weigh in on the 
propriety of prophylactic double mastectomy. While there is ample reason to be concerned 
about bias in decision making for prophylactic double mastectomies in low risk patients, 
there is also considerable basis to view this choice as preference sensitive care. For some 
patients, emotional wellbeing may recommend the more aggressive approach, even if bio-
medical risks do not. 
140  See Surgery to Reduce the Risk of Breast Cancer, NAT’L CANCER INST., https://www.can 
cer.gov/types/breast/risk-reducing-surgery-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/N3MM-NDLJ] (last 
updated Aug. 12. 2013). Such choice also may reflect affective bias, basing a decision on an 
emotional reaction. 
141  Physicians may also fall prey to single factor or lexicographic decision making. 
142  In general, physicians are better decision makers than patients. Physicians have more ed-
ucation and experience and are less emotionally involved. So, some deference is rational, but 
blind deference is not. 
143  See Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
1, 1, 7 (1963) (describing authority bias and its impacts). 
144  See Carl E. Schneider, Bioethics with a Human Face, 69 IND. L.J. 1075, 1097 (1994) 
(stating patients want to be informed but “a quite substantial number of them did not want to 
make their own medical decisions”). 
145  Hibbard & Peters, supra note 69, at 419. 
146  Ancker & Kaufman, supra note 81, at 715; Epstein, supra note 6, at 1284; Schwartz et 
al., supra note 128, at 969. Because patients respond differently to care, risks and benefits in 
medicine are often presented as probabilities. Yet, patients struggle to comprehend this 
presentation. 
147  Hibbard & Peters, supra note 69, at 415–16; Korobkin, supra note 128, at 536, 539. 
148  Hibbard & Peters, supra note 69, at 415–16; Korobkin, supra note 128, at 536, 539. 
149  Hibbard & Peters, supra note 69, at 415–16; see also KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 36, 
59, 79 (stating efforts to analyze several attributes, to process complex or novel information, 
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biases and heuristics when deciding, which simplify healthcare decisions but 
compromise accuracy.150 
D. From Dyad to Triad: The Ideal Role for Guidelines in Physician-Patient 
Decision Making 
Recognizing predictable and pervasive shortcomings in physician and pa-
tient decision making and the impact those failures have on quality of care, as 
well as the potential for Guidelines to improve the process, it is time for a sea 
change in how healthcare decision making occurs.151 Both physicians and pa-
tients need to reorient decision making to provide substantially more attention 
and deference to the scientifically based, thoughtfully considered consensus re-
flected in Guidelines. Guidelines should be treated as the third leg to the stool 
of healthcare decision making, bolstering traditional physician recommendation 
and patient choice. The current largely ad hoc approach to medical decision 
making results in over-treatment, under-treatment, and mistreatment.152 To sta-
bilize this shaky process, physicians should incorporate Guideline recommen-
dations as the default care approach and patients should accord Guidelines 
equal respect as their individual physician’s recommendation.153 
                                                                                                                                
especially with limited time, causes cognitive strain and make heuristic mistakes more like-
ly); Ancker & Kaufman, supra note 81, at 715. 
150  Ancker & Kaufman, supra note 81, at 715; Epstein, supra note 6, at 1281–82; Korobkin, 
supra note 128, at 534. 
151  See, e.g., ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO: HOW TO GET THINGS RIGHT 46 
(2010) (arguing for a wholesale revision in the role of the individual doctor in a complex, 
information-overloaded society and championing checklists and protocols as individual phy-
sicians come to see themselves as part of a larger health care team). Without question, 
checklists and protocols improve patient care and should be part of the holistic response to 
unwarranted care variances. This article endorses guideline disclosure to empower patients 
because checklists and protocols alone would leave all power in the hands of physicians. See 
Epstein, supra note 6 (sounding the alarm that the law of healthcare decision making has 
failed to respond adequately to behavioral economics insights). In June 2018, Amazon, JP 
Morgan, and Berkshire Hathaway announced that Dr. Gawande would serve as CEO of their 
new joint venture to cut healthcare costs and improve quality. Angelica LaVito et al., Ama-
zon’s Joint Health-Care Venture Finally Has a Name: Haven, CNBC (Mar. 6, 2019, 4:05 
PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/06/amazon-jp-morgan-berkshire-hathaway-health-care 
-venture-named-haven.html [https://perma.cc/SJG4-B5NJ]. 
152  2013 IOM REPORT, supra note 14, at 1. 
153  A default is a pre-set course of action to follow, unless the decision maker affirmatively 
specifies differently. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 83 (2008); see also infra Section IV.B. 
While this article suggests using informed consent to reach this goal, other vehicles could 
also be utilized to accomplish this end. 
In 2008, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein published a groundbreaking book, NUDGE: 
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT WEALTH, HEALTH, AND HAPPINESS, that applied behavioral 
economics studies to demonstrate that most people systematically and predictably exercise 
biases and mistakes in healthcare decision making. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra, at 7–8, 19 
(2008). In light of these biases and mistakes, they argued that “choice architecture” should 
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Of course, patients should still play a critical role in healthcare decision 
making.154 Their active participation is an end in itself, and no one else can 
provide the patient’s personal values and preferences.155 Moreover, aside from 
                                                                                                                                
be used to help people make better health choices, without controlling those choices. Id. at 6, 
10–11. People should be “nudged,” but such interventions should remain “easy and cheap to 
avoid.” Id. at 6. While discussing dozens of nudges, Thaler and Sunstein particularly ex-
tolled the value and benefit of setting good defaults. Id. at 8, 12, 83, 85. 
In 2017, Wendy Netter Epstein published a significant article arguing that the law of 
healthcare decision making had failed to respond adequately to such behavioral economic 
insights. Epstein, supra note 6, at 1258. Providing a thorough and detailed analysis of patient 
biases and preference instability, she challenged current emphasis on patient autonomy, and 
she recommended “patient[s] be presented the default treatment for their condition, with the 
default being as personalized as possible given available data.” Id. at 1301. Epstein criticized 
neutral presentation of all treatment options without a recommendation and highlighted the 
importance of an evidence-based approach, but she did not mention Guidelines. Id. at 1260. 
This article builds off the work of Thaler, Sunstein, Epstein and many others who have ad-
vocated for using defaults to nudge better healthcare decision making with a specific, practi-
cal proposal that could be immediately implemented. The certified Guidelines prescribed in 
this Article are materially different than other evidence-based defaults. First, as discussed 
above, the amount of new evidence available to physicians is staggering, and it would be 
literally impossible for physicians to stay abreast of all evidence of best practices relevant to 
their practice. Alper et al., supra note 41, at 436. It would similarly be unwise (and arguably 
a violation of due process) to impose a legal obligation on physicians to obtain and disclose 
available data without specifying to a reasonable degree of certainty the contours of that da-
ta. Physicians need notice of what they are legally required to disclose. This proposal limits 
the scope of required knowledge and disclosure to a manageable one and defines the disclo-
sure obligation. 
Moreover, available evidence is not of equal quality, and the difference between basing a 
recommendation on available data and basing it on the consensus reached after a systematic 
review of the latest evidence is dramatic. To quantify this difference in a way that still un-
derstates its magnitude, the number of Guidelines listed in the National Guideline Clearing-
house dropped 50 percent after implementation of new Inclusion Criteria in 2014, requiring 
that Guidelines be based on a systematic review of the evidence. Paul G. Shekelle, Clinical 
Practice Guidelines: What’s Next?, 320 JAMA 757, 757 (2018). That number would de-
crease still more if only certified Guidelines complying with the 2011 IOM Trustworthiness 
Standards were counted (and the initial numbers were Guidelines—not all available data). 
Certified Guidelines are critical to ensure that any new physician disclosure obligation is re-
alistic, fair, and serves its intended purpose. 
154  Berg, supra note 117, at 593–94 (discussing four benefits to patient participation in in-
formed consent); see also infra Section IV.C. 
155  Moulton & King, supra note 63, at 89, 94 (showing physicians poorly predict patient 
preferences which vary widely); Shaffer, supra note 7, at 733–34 (showing when patients 
use decision aids for preference sensitive care, they are more likely to select treatment); 
Preference Sensitive Care, DARTMOUTH ATLAS HEALTH CARE, http://archive.dartmouthatlas. 
org/keyissues/issue.aspx?con=2938 [https://perma.cc/Q8SP-NRNB] (last visited Apr. 2, 
2019) [hereinafter Dartmouth—Preference Sensitive] (“studies show that when patients are 
fully informed about their options, they often choose very differently from their physi-
cians”). 
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cost, health care decisions primarily impact the patients and generally do not 
harm others.156  
Likewise, individual physicians also remain vital, even when well-
developed Guidelines exist.157 Physicians answer questions and help tailor care 
to a particular patient. The individual physician determines when a Guideline 
applies to a particular patient and in contrast, when co-morbidities or other bio-
logic factors may justify a deviation.158  
Guidelines are equally imperative, however. They prompt physicians and 
patients to select rational, scientifically based medical care, something physi-
cians and patients have struggled to accomplish using a traditional physician-
patient approach. 
Historically, the ad hoc physician-patient decision making model made 
sense. Empirically based recommendations did not exist for the overwhelming 
majority of care decisions.159 Even when Guidelines did exist, they were some-
times of limited trustworthiness and could be difficult to access during decision 
making.160 More recently, however, with the investment in CER and Guideline 
improvement and the enormous expansion of computer use in everyday medi-
cal practice, Guidelines are ready to help revolutionize care.161 To realize the 
promise of Guidelines, physician-patient decision making practices will have to 
change, giving Guidelines a more central role. 
                                                        
156  Melissa Ballengee Alexander, Autonomy and Accountability: Why Informed Consent, 
Consumer Protection, and Defunding May Beat Conversion Therapy Bans, 55 U. 
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 283, 303 (2017) (discussing the importance of patient autonomy). 
157  Trustworthy Guidelines still do not exist for many care decisions, but the quality of 
Guidelines is increasing and should increase further as research and Guidelines funded by 
the ACA’s $4 billion investment bear fruit. 2018 GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 2. 
158  Without question, there are valid reasons to deviate from Guidelines. Patient preference 
may result in a different care approach, especially for preference-sensitive care. Dartmouth—
Preference Sensitive, supra note 155 (defining “preference-sensitive care” as treatment in-
volving significant outcome trade-offs between different options). Moreover, at times, a 
Guideline that ostensibly applies to a patient may not be appropriate given co-morbidities or 
other biologic factors. The proposed remedy intentionally allows cheap and easy deviation 
from Guidelines at the physician’s recommendation or the patient’s preference. This recog-
nizes the importance of allowing deviations that are thoughtfully considered. 
159  Murad, supra note 3, at 423–24 (discussing the history of formal guidelines). 
160  Id. at 424, 429; see also Tamara Kredo et al., Guide to Clinical Practice Guidelines: The 
Current State of Play, 28 INT’L J. QUALITY HEALTH Care 122, 122 (2016) (showing over 
time guidelines “have shifted from opinion-based to evidence-informed, including increas-
ingly sophisticated methodologies . . . .”). 
161  See, e.g., Electronic Medical Records/Electronic Health Records, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/electronic-medical-records.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6YG4-CMQ5] (last updated Mar. 31, 2017) (showing 86.9 percent of of-
fice-based physicians use an electronic medical records system). 
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III. EXPLAINING CURRENT GUIDELINE UNDER-ADHERENCE: LACK OF 
KNOWLEDGE, BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, AND CURRENT LAW 
Why haven’t Guidelines already dramatically improved care? The answer, 
like our healthcare system more generally, is complicated. Multiple factors con-
tinue to impede progress at both the macro and micro levels. At the macro lev-
el, organizations need to develop and implement better care processes, in par-
ticular incorporating effective use of information technologies and knowledge 
and skill management.162 Payment systems need reform to incentivize appro-
priate care and improve value.163 Organizations need to create effective teams 
and better coordinate care across conditions, services, sites, and time.164 These 
reforms should be part of a holistic solution but are beyond the scope of this 
Article, which focuses at the micro level on individual physician and patient 
decision making.165 At the micro level, the first step to improving the salience 
of Guidelines will be to dramatically improve knowledge and familiarity with 
Guidelines.166 
                                                        
162  IOM CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM, supra note 17, at 9; Casey, supra note 4, at 1582 
(recommending the use of checklist-based algorithms). Such changes could greatly facilitate 
Guideline adherence. 
163  2013 IOM REPORT, supra note 14, at 3–4. Fee for service care contributes to over-
treatment. Supply-sensitive care, “where the supply of a specific resource has a major influ-
ence on utilization rates,” reflects another aspect of these payment system problems. Dart-
mouth—Supply Sensitive, supra note 17. Even with better payment structures, however, fi-
nancial incentives may unavoidably leave at least some conflict of interest between 
physician and patients that contributes to waste and to sub-optimal care. 
164  IOM CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM, supra note 17, at 12; see also Dartmouth—
Effective Care, supra note 17. 
165  While beyond the scope of this article, organizational culture can also influence physi-
cians’ clinical decision making. See generally Mantel, supra note 7. Similarly, insurance 
coverage can influence both physician and patient decision making (and distort the 
healthcare market). Some who oppose a heightened reliance on Guidelines do so at least in 
part because of concern over improper use of Guidelines for insurance coverage determina-
tions. While improper use is possible, it is not inherent in Guideline disclosure. After all, the 
use of Guidelines as a default for care decisions differs materially from the use of Guidelines 
for coverage decisions. See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman & Mark A. Hall, Redefining the Terms of 
Health Insurance to Accommodate Varying Consumer Risk Preferences, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 
187, 191–92 (1994) (identifying practical problems with using Guidelines to define insur-
ance contracts). This article recognizes that there are valid reasons to deviate from Guide-
lines. While it proposes structuring choice to encourage Guideline adherence, it also inten-
tionally allows cheap and easy deviations. 
166  Adherence varies greatly between Guidelines and between specific recommendations 
within Guidelines. Marjolein Lugtenberg et al., Why Don’t Physicians Adhere to Guideline 
Recommendations in Practice? An Analysis of Barriers Among Dutch General Practitioners, 
4 IMPLEMENTATION SCI. 1, 4 (2009). Some Guidelines have high adherence, but for many 
Guidelines, adherence remains low. 
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A. Inadequate Knowledge and Familiarity Hinders Guideline Adherence 
All too often physicians lack knowledge or familiarity with Guidelines.167 
It is axiomatic that a Guideline cannot improve physician decision making if 
the physician is not aware that the Guideline exists. Even when aware of a 
Guideline’s existence, if the physician lacks familiarity with the Guideline’s 
specific recommendations, the Guideline cannot significantly influence deci-
sion making.168 Any solution must incentivize improved physician knowledge 
and familiarity. 
Patient decision making presents the same challenge, in more pronounced 
form. Even more so than physicians, patients are largely unaware of the exist-
ence of Guidelines.169 They often do not realize that empiric evidence from 
comparative effectiveness research exists or that there may be carefully consid-
ered national consensus recommendations available.170 Physicians seldom dis-
close Guidelines to patients.171 They may discuss risks and benefits in a way 
that mirrors the evidence summary contained in Guidelines, in whole or in part, 
but they do not typically mention the Guidelines themselves. Most significant-
ly, they do not usually relay the consensus recommendation contained in 
                                                        
167  ACOG GUIDELINE OPINION, supra note 12 (“implementation of protocols and guidelines 
often is delayed because of lack of health care provider awareness”); Cabana et al., supra 
note 4, at 1458, 1461 (“[F]or 78% of the guidelines, more than 10% of physicians are not 
aware of their existence.”); Lugtenberg et al., supra note 166, at 6. 
168  Cabana et al., supra note 4, at 1461 (showing that, often, lack of familiarity with guide-
lines was more of an issue than lack of awareness); Lugtenberg et al., supra note 166, at 4 
(finding, in a Dutch study, general practitioners lacked familiarity with 46 percent of key 
recommendations in Guidelines). 
169  Melissa J. Armstrong et al., Recommendations for Patient Engagement in Guideline De-
velopment Panels: A Qualitative Focus Group Study of Guideline-Naïve Patients, PLOS 
ONE, Mar. 20, 2017, at 2 (“public awareness of guidelines is low”); Fearns et al., supra note 
4, at 11 (finding in a Scotland study that “[t]he public is generally unaware of the existence 
of guidelines, though people are enthusiastic about them once they are made aware of 
them.”). 
170  Armstrong et al., supra note 169, at 2–3 (“[I]ndividuals aware of guidelines have only a 
vague understanding of what they are and how they are developed.”). 
171  See K. Schipper et al., Strategies for Disseminating Recommendations or Guidelines to 
Patients: A Systematic Review, 11 IMPLEMENTATION SCI. 1, 2 (2016) (“patients are not aware 
of the existence of recommendations,” discussing the failure to inform patients of Guidelines 
and recommendations). Moreover, as physicians begin disclosing Guidelines to patients, pa-
tients will be taught to ask for them. In this way, better disclosure practices by one physician 
should beget new patient expectations and demands, which should in turn help ensure that 
other physicians likewise make better Guideline disclosures. 
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Guidelines.172 Until physicians routinely disclose them, Guidelines cannot and 
will not improve patient decision making.173 
B. Cognitive Biases Explain Systematic Guideline Under-Adherence 
Solving this lack of knowledge is a necessary first step in improving deci-
sion making and thereby quality of care, but it is not sufficient alone. As empir-
ic studies have shown, even after becoming familiar with Guidelines, physi-
cians under-adhere to them.174 Cognitive biases help to explain this systematic 
and predictable under-adherence.175 
The same three cognitive biases discussed previously can also explain why 
physicians discount Guidelines in decision making. Status quo bias leads phy-
sicians to instinctually want to approach care the same way they have in the 
past, even after becoming familiar with Guidelines that would cause a purely 
rational decision maker to change treatment method.176 Status quo bias makes 
physicians slow to innovate and encourages physicians to undervalue or even 
ignore new Guidelines that suggest a different practice.177 
Other biases explain how physicians may justify under-adherence, even 
when it is not empirically warranted. When physicians who are familiar with 
Guidelines deviate, they report two primary reasons (aside from macro-barriers 
and patient preference): (1) belief that their own judgment is superior, at least 
for a particular patient, or (2) belief that the Guideline is biased or otherwise 
                                                        
172  Id. Physicians may indirectly relay a Guideline recommendation if that recommendation 
accords with their own recommendation, but that is not as informative as also relaying the 
consensus. For patients, the evidence-based, consensus recommendation of experts reflected 
in Guidelines may have special weight. 
173  For efficiency and to set a more traditional default, this proposal does not require disclo-
sure of Guidelines unless care will deviate from the Guideline recommendation. This limited 
reform directly targets unjustified care variances. However, there may also be good reasons 
to disclose Guidelines even when they accord with physician recommendation and patient 
preference. More routine Guideline disclosure seems likely to reduce anxiety and simplify 
patient decision making. 
174  See, e.g., Catherine L. Chen et al., Preoperative Medical Testing in Medicare Patients 
Undergoing Cataract Surgery, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1530, 1535 (2015) (citing “no differ-
ence in the prevalence of testing as compared with 20 years ago, before the introduction of 
guidelines stating that routine preoperative testing for cataract surgery was not necessary,” to 
conclude that publishing Guidelines alone does not necessarily change individual physician 
behavior). 
175  Deepika Mohan et al., Assessing the Validity of Using Serious Game Technology to Ana-
lyze Physician Decision Making, PLOS ONE, Aug. 25, 2014, at 6 (stating heuristics play an 
important role in physician decision making and can help explain failure to follow Guide-
lines). 
176  See Chen et al., supra note 174, at 1535; Croskerry, supra note 64, at 1192; Emanuel et 
al., supra note 86, at 115. 
177  Casey, supra note 4, at 1581 (stating it takes seventeen years for evidence to be incorpo-
rated into practice). 
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not sound.178 Overconfidence bias and availability bias explain why these ra-
tionales often reflect heuristic mistakes rather than sound scientific reason-
ing.179 
Overconfidence bias leads physicians to greatly overestimate their own 
skill and knowledge as compared to Guidelines.180 At least on average, physi-
cians are wrong about having superior judgment.181 Better information, multi-
ple perspectives, and a more deliberative process all suggest that Guidelines 
usually provide higher quality care recommendations than an individual physi-
cian can. Yet, overconfidence causes physicians to question Guidelines and to 
overestimate their own judgment for care.182 
Similarly, “availability bias” causes physicians to doubt the soundness of 
Guidelines, without adequate scientific basis. Because physicians naturally treat 
available memories as most relevant, they often overestimate the importance of 
their recent clinical experience.183 This leads them to question Guidelines, even 
when empirically Guidelines rest on sounder scientific foundation than the in-
dividual physician’s random clinical outcomes or impression.184 So, even when 
physicians are familiar with robust evidence supporting a Guideline, they may 
intuitively and unconsciously discount that evidence if it contradicts their per-
sonal experiences. This causes them to systematically undervalue Guidelines. 
Bounded rationality also significantly impacts patient decision making, but 
in a different way. Unlike physicians, most patients are not ignoring or dis-
counting Guidelines, they are wholly unaware of them.185 Not told that an em-
pirically based, consensus recommendation exists and overwhelmed by the 
complexity and novelty of medical decision making, most patients employ the 
                                                        
178  See id. at 1582; see also Cabana et al., supra note 4, at 1459–61. 
179  Guidelines are imperfect and sometimes change when better evidence comes to light or 
physicians discover a reliable basis for predicting more individualized risk. Nonetheless, 
empiric evidence establishes that guideline adherence improves patient outcomes and that 
physicians overestimate their own ability to determine appropriate individual deviations. See 
Murad, supra note 3, at 429. 
180  KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 263; Berner & Graber, supra note 97, at S2; Croskerry, 
supra note 64, at 1193; Croskerry & Norman, supra note 97, at S27 (stating overconfidence 
is one of the most significant cognitive biases in physician decision making). 
181  See KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 249 (showing that physicians discount known base 
rates when inconsistent with their impression of a particular patient on the basis that the pa-
tient is unique, despite evidence that belies this exceptionalism). 
182  Berner & Graber, supra note 97, at S2; Croskerry, supra note 64, at 1193; Croskerry & 
Norman, supra note 97, at S27; Greaney, supra note 7, at 1197; see KAHNEMAN, supra note 
49, at 262–63. 
183  See KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 111, 130, 249. 
184  See id. at 249. 
185  Armstrong et al., supra note 169, at 2–3 (showing that “public awareness of guidelines is 
low and that individuals aware of guidelines have only a vague understanding of what they 
are and how they are developed”); Fearns et al., supra note 4, at 11 (“The public is generally 
unaware of the existence of guidelines, though people are enthusiastic about them once they 
are made aware of them.”). 
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decision simplification heuristics of adopting whatever their physician recom-
mends.186 This approach enables the patient to simplify (or even avoid) taxing 
and often emotionally costly medical decisions.187 
Physicians do not always make recommendations, however, and when they 
do not, patients may rely on other, often even less accurate heuristics.188 If pa-
tients had a better decision simplification tool available, like Guideline recom-
mendations, they could use it.189 Increasing knowledge of this more reliable de-
cision simplification tool and at the same time nudging the physicians’ 
recommendations should have a significant impact on patient decision making. 
C. Current Law Does Not Require Guideline Adherence or Disclosure 
Knowing that physicians and patients systematically under-adhere to 
Guidelines, the question becomes whether the law can help increase the sali-
ence of Guidelines. To answer this question, one must first understand how 
Guidelines interact with laws governing malpractice and informed consent.190 
                                                        
186  Dartmouth—Preference Sensitive, supra note 155 (“patients commonly delegate deci-
sion-making to physicians”); Korobkin, supra note 128, at 540 (“a large number of patients 
employ the simple heuristic of adopting their physician’s recommendation”); see also 
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 153, at 157 (“Doctors are crucial choice architects . . .”); 
Schneider, supra note 144, at 1097 (stating many patients “did not want to make their own 
medical decisions”). 
187  Korobkin, supra note 128, at 537–38 (discussing how trading off attributes can be diffi-
cult emotionally). 
188  Physicians are not legally obligated to make care recommendations. Am. Med. Ass’n, 
The AMA Code of Medical Ethics’ Opinions on Informing Patients, 14 VIRTUAL MENTOR 
555, 555 (2012) [hereinafter AMA Ethics Opinion] (encouraging physicians to “make rec-
ommendations” but only recognizing an “ethical obligation to help the patient make choices 
from among the therapeutic alternatives consistent with good medical practice”); see also 
Moulton & King, supra note 63, at 88–89. Many physicians choose to do so, but some do 
not or do not always. See Epstein, supra note 6, at 1301 (“nothing in the law requires that 
physicians promote any particular option over another”). 
189  Since physicians are authority figures and most patients trust and respect their physi-
cians, some patients may continue to defer to their physicians’ recommendation, if any, even 
after being told of Guidelines. This significant and, at times, blind deference to physician 
recommendations explains why the law may treat the physician-patient relationship as a fi-
duciary one and restrict physicians’ ability to limit liability based on agreement. See, e.g., 
Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 448 (Cal. 1963). 
190  Malpractice creates potential tort liability for physicians who cause harm when they 
breach the standard of care. While states vary in the exact approach, most define the standard 
of care by what a reasonably prudent or minimally competent physician would have done 
under similar circumstances. See, e.g., Locke v. Pachtman, 521 N.W.2d 786, 791 (Mich. 
1994) (stating that the standard of care is determined by what a “reasonably prudent” physi-
cian would have done); McCarty v. Mladineo, 636 So. 2d 377, 381 (Miss. 1994) (stating that 
the standard of care is set by what a “reasonably prudent, minimally competent” physician 
would have done); McCourt v. Abernathy, 457 S.E.2d 603, 607 (S.C. 1995) (stating that the 
standard of care is “determined by what an ordinary careful and prudent physician would 
have done”). 
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In malpractice cases, the enforceability of Guidelines varies by state and, to 
some extent, by practice area.191 However, most courts have held that Guide-
lines regarding a practice are probative, but not dispositive, evidence of the 
standard of care.192 There are outlier cases; some courts have excluded evi-
dence of Guidelines altogether and others have treated Guidelines as disposi-
tive.193 Nonetheless, most courts treat Guidelines as “some evidence” of the 
standard of care.194 So, most physicians need not adhere to Guidelines to avoid 
malpractice liability, and conversely, adhering to Guidelines does not generally 
provide a safe harbor from such liability.195 
                                                                                                                                
This standard, heavily influenced by custom and practice, relies on expert testimony and 
does not typically include survey or other empiric evidence of what other similar practition-
ers are doing (or have done). See Tim Cramm et al., Ascertaining Customary Care in Mal-
practice Cases: Asking Those Who Know, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 699, 711–12 (2002); see 
also Mehlman, supra note 6, at 1184–86. 
In some cases, courts have held that, if a physician can establish that he acted in accordance 
with generally recognized and accepted practice, the plaintiff cannot prevail even if the 
plaintiff proves that the prevailing practice is ineffective or otherwise undesirable. See, e.g., 
Doe v. Am. Red Cross Blood Servs., 377 S.E.2d 323, 326 (S.C. 1989) (finding that a profes-
sional has no liability for failure to screen blood for HIV when screening was not customary 
practice). Recently, however, many states have moved from a purely custom-based standard 
of care to incorporate more of a reasonable physician standard, asking not just what physi-
cians ordinarily do but also what they should do. MARK A. HALL ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW 
AND ETHICS 292 (9th ed. 2018). 
191  Mehlman, supra note 6, at 1220–21, app. at 1233–35; see also Conn v. United States, 
880 F. Supp. 2d 741, 747 (S.D. Miss. 2012) (holding that experts may rely on clinical prac-
tice guidelines). 
192  Mehlman, supra note 6, at 1220–21, app. at 1233–35 (summarizing reported cases from 
1995-2011, the overwhelming majority of which treated Guidelines as “some evidence” of 
the standard of care); Chris Taylor, The Use of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Determining 
Standard of Care, 35 J. LEGAL MED. 273, 279–80 (2014) (stating that most courts have al-
lowed introduction of guidelines as relevant but not as defining the standard of care); see 
Jilek v. Stockson, 796 N.W.2d 267, 275 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010); Frakes v. Cardiology Con-
sultants, No. 01-A-01-9702-CV-00069, 1997 WL 536949, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 
1997). 
193  See, e.g., Conn, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 747 (holding that experts may rely on clinical practice 
guidelines). But see, e.g., Liberatore v. Kaufman, 835 So. 2d 404, 405 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2003) (holding trial court abused its discretion by admitting specialty practice bulletin to 
support expert testimony). 
194  See Mehlman, supra note 6, at 1220–21, app. at 1233–35 (summarizing reported cases 
from 1995-2011, the overwhelming majority of which treated Guidelines as “some evi-
dence” of the standard of care); Taylor, supra note 192, at 279–80 (stating that most courts 
have allowed introduction of guidelines as relevant but not as defining the standard of care); 
see also Jilek, 796 N.W.2d at 275; Frakes, 1997 WL 536949, at *5. 
195  See Avraham, supra note 6, at 300–02 (showing only twenty-eight cases of successful 
guideline use in malpractice cases from 2000 to 2010). From 1989 to 1999, Maine experi-
mented with using guidelines as a defense or safe harbor for malpractice. Id. at 305–06. Flor-
ida has also tried a more limited safe harbor initiative for caesarian sections. Neither initia-
tive appeared to significantly impact physician behavior. Id. at 306–07. Most states do not 
recognize an express “safe harbor” for guideline compliance. 
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One might expect nonetheless that, at minimum, physicians would be re-
quired to disclose Guidelines to patients given Guidelines’ potential value to 
medical decision making.196 This does not appear to be the case. While no case 
has considered this question directly and there is relatively little case law delin-
eating the scope of mandatory informed consent disclosures, existing precedent 
suggests that physicians are not required to disclose Guidelines.197 
States define mandatory disclosures through their informed consent 
laws.198 Historically, the doctrine of informed consent traces its roots in the 
United States to Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, a 1914 opinion 
authored by Justice Cardozo holding that patient consent must precede medical 
care.199 The decision in Schloendorff was based largely on the ethical principle 
of bodily integrity and the legal principle of avoiding battery.200 Over time, as 
physician paternalism has waned and patient autonomy grown, informed con-
sent has evolved and expanded.201 Today, informed consent rests on the ethical 
norm of autonomy, as well as bodily integrity, and requires information disclo-
sure as opposed to merely permission to touch.202 
While all fifty states have informed consent requirements, states vary re-
garding the scope of disclosures required.203 Most states have adopted one of 
two general approaches to determine the scope of the physician’s duty to dis-
close.204 About half of states follow the traditional “physician-based” standard, 
                                                        
196  The standard of care required to avoid medical malpractice cannot generally be altered 
through informed consent disclosure, and the two doctrines are typically legally distinct. So, 
a physician may engage in malpractice even after obtaining proper informed consent, or 
conversely, a physician may be liable for breach of informed consent even if the physician’s 
treatment adhered to the standard of care. HALL ET AL., supra note 190, at 409. Some states, 
however, merge the two legal doctrines and discuss breach of informed consent as a type of 
medical malpractice. See, e.g., Bradley v. Sugarbaker, 809 F.3d 8, 14–15 (1st Cir. 2015) 
(merging lack of informed consent with malpractice). 
197  Anecdotally, I would add that my physicians have never shared Guidelines with me. 
198  See FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 144 (8th ed. 2018). 
199  Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 92–93 (N.Y. 1914), abrogated on 
other grounds by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957). 
200  Id. at 93. 
201  JANET L. DOLGIN & LOIS L. SHEPARD, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 46 (4th ed. 2019). 
202  Today, informed consent typically rests on the legal doctrine of negligence or medical 
malpractice rather than battery. JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL 
THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 46 (2d ed. 2001). 
203  Nadia N. Sawicki, Mandating Disclosure of Conscience-Based Limitations on Medical 
Practice, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 85, 110–11 (2016). States also differ regarding when physi-
cians are required to obtain informed consent. For example, some states limit informed con-
sent requirements to surgical or other invasive treatments. Most states limit informed consent 
requirements in an emergency. Id. at n.119. 
204  Some scholars argue for adoption of a particular patient standard, which would rely on 
the expressed values and preferences of the particular patient to determine what constitutes 
“material” information. See Robert Gatter, Informed Consent Law and the Forgotten Duty of 
Physician Inquiry, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 557, 559 (2000). So far, only a small number of ju-
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which imposes a duty for a physician to disclose what a reasonably prudent 
physician would customarily disclose to a patient under similar circumstanc-
es.205 This physician-based disclosure standard provides wide deference to phy-
sicians to determine for themselves the amount and type of information that 
should be provided. 
The remaining states follow the “reasonable patient” standard.206 This 
standard requires physicians to disclose the information that a reasonable pa-
tient in the plaintiff’s position would deem material under the circumstances.207 
In 1972 in Canterbury v. Spence, the seminal reasonable patient standard case, 
the court stated that the scope of disclosure required “must be measured by the 
patient’s need, and that need is the information material to the decision.”208 The 
reasonable patient standard with its “materiality” test would eventually be 
adopted by approximately half of all states.209 
Under either the physician-based or the reasonable patient standard, the 
scope and content of the duty to disclosure remains vague and undefined. There 
is no place to look up what a “reasonable patient” would consider “material” 
under the circumstances or to definitively establish what a reasonably prudent 
physician would customarily disclose.210 Case law in this area remains fact-
sensitive and relatively sparse. So, it is hard to draw conclusions with certainty. 
1. Physician-Based States Almost Certainly Do Not Require Guideline 
Disclosure 
Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that physicians are legally obligated to dis-
close Guidelines in physician-based disclosure states.211 The American Medical 
                                                                                                                                
risdictions have adopted this “particular patient” approach. HALL ET AL., supra note 190, at 
158. 
205  HALL ET AL., supra note 190, at 158; see also Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98, 104 
(Ind. 1992); Hamilton v. Bares, 678 N.W.2d 74, 79 (Neb. 2004). 
206  Even within the two basic approaches to determining required disclosures, states vary 
regarding the exact standard and requirements. 
207  Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
208  Id. at 786. 
209  See Nadia N. Sawicki, Modernizing Informed Consent: Expanding the Boundaries of 
Materiality, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 821, 829 (2016) (stating that approximately half of all 
states follow the reasonable patient standard in informed consent cases); see also, e.g., Mil-
ler-McGee v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 920 A.2d 430, 443–44 (D.C. 2007). 
210  Guidelines could be instructive, as they discuss principal risks, benefits, and alternatives. 
They are unlikely to be dispositive, however. Similar to the connection between Guidelines 
and the standard of care, Guidelines are relevant to informed consent disclosures, but they do 
not necessarily reflect customary physician practice nor what a reasonable patient may deem 
material under specific circumstances. 
211  Significantly, informed consent currently takes a “no harm, no foul” approach to disclo-
sure failures. Even if a physician fails to disclose required information, the plaintiff cannot 
recover unless that failure proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury. See FURROW ET AL., su-
pra note 198, at 160–61. This requires proof that if the required information had been dis-
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Association (“AMA”) Code of Ethics requires physicians to disclose infor-
mation about: “(i) the diagnosis (when known); (ii) the nature and purpose of 
recommended interventions; [and] (iii) the burdens, risks, and expected benefits 
of all options, including foregoing treatment.”212 Legal scholars sometimes re-
fer to such information as the “standard risk-and-benefit disclosure,” because it 
is the information typically required by informed consent.213 Since the consen-
sus recommendation reflected in Guidelines is not a diagnosis, recommended 
intervention, nor a burden, risk, or benefit of a treatment option, Guidelines ap-
pear to fall outside of the standard risk-and-benefit disclosure.214 As such, they 
are unlikely to be mandatory disclosures. 
Some ambiguity remains regarding this result, however, because the physi-
cian-based standard turns in part on custom, typically established by expert tes-
timony.215 While the AMA Code of Ethics may influence that expert testimony 
and custom, or even be separately admissible, it is probably not dispositive it-
self.216 The Code of Ethics arguably tells what a physician should disclose ra-
                                                                                                                                
closed, the patient would, more likely than not, have selected a different treatment option. Id. 
The mere failure to provide adequate information for effective decision making is not ac-
tionable. Id. 
Some scholars argue that informed consent should be reformed to provide a dignity-based 
remedy for disclosure failures. See, e.g., Rita Barnett-Rose, Informed Consent, Psychotropic 
Medications, and a Prescribing Physician’s Duty to Disclose Safer Alternative Treatments, 
16 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 67, 100 (2014). This article takes no position on remedy re-
forms, and instead posits that changing the ethical and legal standard of informed consent 
should have a meaningful impact on physician behavior even if the new duty is only nomi-
nally enforceable in tort. 
212  AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS 29 (2017). The Principles of Medical Ethics 
and the Opinions of the AMA Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs together make up the 
AMA Code of Ethics. Code of Medical Ethics Overview, AMA, https://www.ama-assn.org/d 
elivering-care/ethics/code-medical-ethics-overview [https://perma.cc/H2U6-6KVK] (last 
visited Apr. 4, 2019). 
213  Sawicki, supra note 203, at 111 (describing these as the “standard risk-and-benefit dis-
closure” that all jurisdictions require). 
214  To be clear, this article posits that patients should be told that nationally certified Guide-
lines promulgated by a panel of experts recommend (a particular approach) based on empiric 
evidence, prior to deviation from the Guideline recommendation. This statement relaying the 
Guideline’s evidence-based, consensus recommendation differs from any statements relay-
ing the risks, benefits and alternatives themselves. 
215  Cramm et al., supra note 190, at 701. 
216  Moreover, another provision of the Code of Ethics injects additional uncertainty into the 
scope of required disclosures. In Opinion 8.08, the Code of Ethics instructs physicians to 
disclose “all relevant medical information,” but then caveats that “[t]he quantity and speci-
ficity of this information should be tailored to meet the preferences and needs of individual 
patients.” AMA Ethics Opinion, supra note 188, at 555. This arguably expands the scope of 
disclosures but also provides significant physician discretion. 
As applied to Guidelines, the existence and content of consensus recommendations seem 
clearly “relevant.” Nonetheless, this type of guideline recommendation has not traditionally 
been regarded as required “medical” information. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(i) (2012) (de-
fining “medical information”). Certainly, physicians do not seem to be disclosing guidelines. 
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ther than what a reasonably prudent physician customarily would disclose. Still, 
customary disclosures tend to be laxer, not more expansive, than set forth in the 
Code of Ethics.217 So, Guidelines almost certainly are not currently required 
disclosures in physician-based disclosure states. 
2. Reasonable-Patient States Likely Do Not Require Guideline 
Disclosure, Even if They Should 
The question is a much closer call in states that have adopted the reasona-
ble patient approach. Guidelines seem to be the type of information that would 
be “material” to a reasonable patient, as they provide important context and 
valuable information for decision making. Speaking descriptively, however, 
most (but not all) courts have interpreted the scope of “material” information as 
limited to the standard risk-and-benefit disclosure.218 They apply materiality to 
delineate which risk, benefit and alternative must be disclosed, not to expand 
disclosures to other types of information.219 Even in reasonable patient states, 
few courts have found liability for failure to disclose information beyond the 
standard risk-and-benefit disclosure.220 Since Guidelines are not within the 
                                                                                                                                
See Fearns et al., supra note 4, at 11 (finding that “[t]he public is generally unaware of the 
existence of guidelines”); see also Armstrong et al., supra note 169. 
217  Moulton & King, supra note 63, at 87–88. 
218  See Sawicki, supra note 209, at 837 (arguing that “it is increasingly obvious that what 
counts as ‘material’ information for the average patient may not [sic] captured by the com-
mon law disclosure duty.”). 
219  See Duffy v. Flagg, 905 A.2d 15, 23 (Conn. 2006) (finding that a patient cannot expand 
the limited disclosure required by informed consent by asking the provider more questions); 
Miller-McGee v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 920 A.2d 430, 440 (D.C. 2007) (“[A]t a minimum, a 
physician must disclose the nature of the condition, the nature of the proposed treatment, any 
alternate treatment procedures, and the nature and degree of risks and benefits inherent in 
undergoing and in abstaining from the proposed treatment.”) (quoting Crain v. Allison, 443 
A.2d 558, 562 (D.C. 1982)) (alteration in original); Duttry v. Patterson, 771 A.2d 1255, 1258 
(Pa. 2001). But see, e.g., Dingle v. Belin, 749 A.2d 157, 170 (Md. 2000) (finding that in-
formed consent requires disclosure of who will be conducting or supervising the procedure); 
Johnson ex rel. Adler v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 506, 509 (Wis. 1996) (finding a 
breach of informed consent duty because of a failure to disclose inexperience and substan-
tially higher statistical risk with an inexperienced surgeon). 
220  Sawicki, supra note 209, at 833. Nadia Sawicki suggests an optimal scope for required 
informed consent disclosures. She contends that disclosures should include non-medical in-
formation that a reasonable patient would consider “material” if within the physician’s 
knowledge and expertise and not contrary to public policy. See id. Guideline recommenda-
tions fall within Sawicki’s proposed scope. Most patients would consider them material. 
They fall within physicians’ expertise, and they are not contrary to public policy. 
That being said, outside of Guideline recommendations, this article expresses no opinion on 
what non-medical information should be considered “material” information for healthcare 
decision making. It does note, however, that clear disclosure requirements are both more ef-
fective and fairer than unpredictable ones, and that the cost of any required disclosures in 
time, money, and confusion should always be weighed against the alleged benefits. 
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standard risk-and-benefit disclosure, physicians are probably not legally obli-
gated to disclose them even in reasonable patient states.221 
IV.  REFORMING INFORMED CONSENT TO REQUIRE GUIDELINE DISCLOSURE 
WOULD NUDGE QUALITY CARE AND PROMOTE ETHICS 
If the goal is to improve decision making through increasing Guidelines’ 
salience, the law can help by requiring disclosure of Guidelines as part of in-
formed consent.222 This legal change would improve knowledge and familiarity 
with Guidelines, and behavioral economics suggests that it should also effec-
tively nudge physician and patient decision making toward quality care.223 Eth-
ically, disclosure of Guidelines should better align medical decision making 
practices with autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice. At mini-
mum, patients should be told that empirically based, thoughtfully considered 
consensus recommendations exist before they consent to other care that devi-
ates from such recommendations. 
                                                        
221  Some commentators have suggested that the reasonable patient disclosure standard is 
broader. See, e.g., Hindi E. Stohl, When Consent Does Not Help: Challenges to Women’s 
Access to a Vaginal Birth After Cesarean Section and the Limitations of the Informed Con-
sent Doctrine, 43 AM. J.L. & MED. 388, 403 (2017). Prescriptively, I may agree that it should 
be, but descriptively, courts have seldom enforced it outside the context of the standard risk-
and-benefit disclosure. The cases evidence disconnect between broad dicta and narrow hold-
ings, although I readily acknowledge that the fact-sensitive nature of cases in this area makes 
accurate predictions difficult. 
Moreover, the fact that many physicians do not perceive a legal obligation to disclose Guide-
lines (as they are often unfamiliar with them and almost never disclose them) is far more 
significant than whether or not the physician-perception is correct. Until physicians feel ob-
ligated to disclose Guidelines, Guidelines cannot play the central role they should in 
healthcare decision making. The law (or AMA ethical opinion) needs to be clarified to en-
sure that physicians recognize an express obligation to disclose evidence-based, consensus 
recommendations to patients. 
222  The most efficient and effective way to implement this informed consent change would 
be to revise AMA Code of Ethics Opinion 2.1.1 to include disclosure of applicable Guideline 
recommendations as a fourth type of required information. See CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, 
supra note 212, at 29. This revision should influence physician practice immediately as an 
ethical obligation and over time as a legal obligation, as the new standard becomes incorpo-
rated into expert testimony of what a reasonably prudent physician would customarily dis-
close. See William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and Ameri-
can Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1770 (1999) (extolling the benefit of using ethical 
obligations for disclosure obligations in the context of conflicts of interest). Similarly, it may 
take some time for courts to embrace it when interpreting what information is material to a 
reasonable patient. Nonetheless, this approach would still probably be faster and at least as 
efficacious as trying to adopt new laws, regulations, or precedents in all fifty states. 
223  Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs, supra note 81, at 2–3. 
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A. Disclosure Improves Physician and Patient Knowledge of Guidelines 
Mandatory disclosure should help alleviate the deficiency in physician and 
patient knowledge of Guidelines.224 Physicians would have to become more 
familiar with Guidelines to satisfy their legal and ethical informed consent ob-
ligations.225 Such increased familiarity alone should improve physician deci-
sion making, as physicians have better information from which to make quality 
care decisions.226 
Patients would likewise benefit from increased knowledge as they learn of 
Guidelines from their physicians’ disclosures prior to any deviation.227 The ev-
idence based, consensus recommendation in Guidelines will provide patients 
with important context with which to critically evaluate their care options. 
Guidelines tell patients what a majority of experts recommend after a systemat-
ic review of empiric evidence. To the extent the Guideline recommendation dif-
fers from their individual physician’s recommendation or their personal prefer-
ence, patients need to understand this divergence. Over time, patients should 
come to expect and to regularly rely on the more rational, scientifically based 
Guideline recommendations in making care decisions. Improving physician and 
                                                        
224  ACOG GUIDELINE OPINION, supra note 12 (“Implementation of protocols and guidelines 
often is delayed because of lack of health care provider awareness . . . .”); Cabana et al., su-
pra note 4, at 1461 (“[F]or 78% of guidelines, more than 10% of physicians are not aware of 
their existence.”); Lugtenberg et al., supra note 166, at 4; see also Epstein, supra note 6, at 
1306 (requiring physicians to disclose evidence based “defaults” would educate physicians). 
225  Requiring physician disclosure of the medico-legal recommendation contained in Guide-
lines arguably raises First Amendment concerns. However, under Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992), mandatory disclosure of 
Guidelines seems more likely to be treated as regulation of professional conduct that inci-
dentally burdens speech, which courts have traditionally upheld. In Casey, the court rejected 
a free-speech challenge to an informed-consent law that required disclosure of gestation age 
and the availability of printed materials from the State on financial assistance, reasoning that 
the law should be understood as a regulation of professional conduct that incidentally bur-
dens speech. Id. at 884. While National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 
138 S. Ct. 2361, 2375 (2018), held that a different abortion disclosure law was likely a viola-
tion of the First Amendment, the court reached this conclusion after affirming the informed 
consent carve-out in Casey and finding that the disclosure law before it was “not an in-
formed-consent requirement or any other regulation of professional conduct.” Id. at 2373. 
Mandatory guideline disclosure looks far more like Casey than like Becerra, which involved 
the regulation of pregnancy crisis centers regardless of whether or not the crisis centers of-
fered any medical procedures. For more analysis of the First Amendment and informed con-
sent, see Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1258–60 (2016); David 
Orentlicher, Abortion and Compelled Physician Speech, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 9 (2015); 
Nadia N. Sawicki, Informed Consent as Compelled Professional Speech: Fictions, Facts, 
and Open Questions, 50 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 11 (2016). 
226  Of course, correcting information shortcomings alone does not counter any cognitive bi-
ases that may impede adoption of rational, scientifically based care recommendations, but it 
should still improve decision making somewhat. 
227  See Armstrong et al., supra note 169, at 12–13; Fearns et al., supra note 4, at 4. 
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patient knowledge of Guidelines is an essential first step in improving medical 
decision making. 
B. Disclosure Should Nudge Decision Making Toward Quality Care 
The next step is nudging decision making to counter cognitive biases and 
to make Guideline adherence the easiest cognitive path, without limiting physi-
cian discretion or patient choice. A nudge is any method of intentionally struc-
turing choice to influence behavior in a predictable way, without controlling 
that choice.228 Nudges should be “easy and cheap to avoid.”229 
1. Nudging Physicians 
Behavioral economics suggests that informed consent discussion of Guide-
lines could nudge better physician decision making in four ways.230 First, re-
quiring disclosure of Guidelines prior to deviation sets a new and better “de-
fault” for care.231 If physicians start from the premise that Guidelines usually 
provide the appropriate care approach, Guidelines should effectively act as a 
default.232 Defaults are sticky, meaning that decision makers tend to defer to 
them.233 So, if individual physicians treat Guideline recommendations as the 
starting point, they will be less likely to recommend unwarranted variations and 
                                                        
228  THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 153, at 6. Choice architecture is the intentional organi-
zation of “the context in which people make decisions.” Id. at 3. 
229  Id. at 6. 
230  Mandatory disclosure imposes a new requirement on physicians, not merely a nudge. 
The expectation, however, is that this limited disclosure requirement will also nudge physi-
cians’ care recommendations towards greater Guideline adherence. 
231  See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 153, at 73; Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs, supra 
note 81, at 2–3; see also Epstein, supra note 6, at 1306 (requiring physicians to make a rec-
ommendation instead of being neutral will nudge them to be educated on the best approach). 
As discussed below, priming, social nudge, and accountability justification all suggest that 
disclosure could trigger physicians treating Guidelines more like defaults for care. 
232  See Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs, supra note 81, at 3 (“Defaults nudge not only the 
actions of patients but also those of physicians.”). This default could be reinforced by pre-
programed, automatically generated electronic prompts in accordance with the Guideline 
approach, which could be manually changed if warranted. See Shaffer, supra note 7, at 733 
(recognizing the effectiveness of electronic health records preselecting the generic version of 
a drug). Ideally, this default would also be strengthened by a requirement that physicians 
briefly document the reason for any deviation from the Guideline in the medical records in 
order to make the default stickier. See ACOG GUIDELINE OPINION, supra note 12, at 2 (sug-
gesting that physicians should “document clearly the rationale for deviation from any rec-
ommended practice”); Kapp, supra note 6, at 540 (suggesting that physicians should be re-
quired to document the reason for any deviation in the medical record). 
233  Epstein, supra note 6, at 1294. 
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more likely to adhere to Guidelines, absent rational justification for devia-
tion.234 
Second, relaying the consensus view of other physicians, as stated in 
Guidelines, should serve as a “social nudge,” influencing individual physicians 
to adopt the Guideline position.235 Physicians, like most people, respond to peer 
pressure. They tend to want to act in accordance with their peers, and remind-
ing them when their approach differs from their peers can be quite effective at 
increasing conformity.236 Since Guidelines reflect a consensus view, requiring 
individual physicians to disclose that consensus recommendation prior to de-
viation should naturally nudge physicians to greater adherence.237 
Third, the act of discussing Guidelines may also “prime” physicians to give 
Guidelines greater weight.238 Studies suggest that our minds are influenced by 
subconscious cues, and mentioning a concept may influence our behavior to 
orient more towards that concept.239 While this area of behavioral economics is 
more controversial and less well understood, studies suggest that discussing 
Guidelines may actually subconsciously increase the prominence of Guidelines 
in physicians’ minds, thereby influencing physicians to choose adherence more 
often. 
Fourth, if a physician still believes that deviating from a Guideline pro-
vides the optimal care approach, the process of having to explain why should 
                                                        
234  See Emanuel et al., supra note 86, at 115–17 (recognizing the need for and effectiveness 
of new defaults given physician status quo bias and the benefit of setting the right action as 
the “path of least resistance” given limits of willpower). 
235  Id. at 116 (recognizing that physicians are “heavily influenced by their perception of how 
their performance compares with those around them”); Amol S. Navathe & Ezekiel J. 
Emanuel, Physician Peer Comparisons as a Nonfinancial Strategy to Improve the Value of 
Care, 316 JAMA 1759, 1759 (2016) (describing social nudges as a “powerful tool to help 
physicians reduce unnecessary and unjustified variations in care”). 
236  See Mantel, supra note 7, at 489–90 (“physicians have a strong propensity to imitate 
their peers”). 
237  Some critics may worry that physicians would feel too much pressure to adhere to 
Guidelines, conforming even when there is a valid reason to deviate. This result is possible 
but unlikely to be common, and given the pervasive and costly under-adherence in the cur-
rent system, it is a small risk well worth taking. 
238  Along with setting a default and using social nudges, priming is one of the fundamental 
means of influencing choice in keeping with liberal paternalism. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra 
note 153, at 5, 69–71 (recognizing information, peer pressure, and priming as ways to influ-
ence behavior); Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs, supra note 81, at 8 tbl.1 (recognizing de-
faults, social nudges, and priming as key tools to nudge and discussing how to utilize such 
tools ethically). 
239  Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs, supra note 81, at 6 (recognizing the effectiveness of 
priming as a means to influence healthcare decision making); Patricia S. Groves et al., Prim-
ing Patient Safety Through Nursing Handoff Communications: A Simulation Pilot Study, 39 
W.J. NURSING RES. 1394, 1399, 1407 (2016) (stating early evidence suggests nurses’ behav-
ior could be primed by safety language); Lutfey et al., supra note 58, at 16–18, 22–23 (evi-
dencing effectiveness of priming physicians to counter cognitive bias and address unwar-
ranted variations in context of coronary heart disease). 
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serve as an “accountable justification,” helping to ensure a rational basis for 
deviation.240 Studies show that actively considering contrary evidence is one of 
the most effective de-biasing strategies, especially in countering overconfi-
dence.241 Moreover, having to account to another for a decision tends to de-
crease heuristic mistakes.242 Requiring a physician to acknowledge that the 
Guideline recommends a different approach and to explain his or her rationale 
for deviation to the patient should make physician decision making more ra-
tional.243 For these reasons, behavioral economics suggests that informed con-
sent discussion of Guidelines may be surprisingly effective at improving physi-
cian decision making. 
2. Nudging Patients 
Mandating disclosure of Guidelines should likewise improve patient deci-
sion making. Guideline recommendations provide patients with an optimal “de-
fault.”244 They offer an empirically based, thoughtfully considered consensus 
recommendation that reflects the best choice for most patients. As such, they 
present patients with a more reliable decision simplification tool and help struc-
ture choices so that the easiest cognitive path for patients corresponds to the 
choice that is most likely to be beneficial. This makes it more likely that pa-
tients will make better health choices, without controlling these choices.245 
In contrast, there may be no default under the current system, as physicians 
are not legally obligated to provide a care recommendation and can leave pa-
tients floundering to decide.246 Even when physicians choose to make a rec-
                                                        
240  It would be difficult to include all necessary Guideline disclosures in the generic pre-
printed informed consent forms patients are sometimes given before seeing a physician be-
cause Guidelines address a specific clinical circumstance. However, if physicians found a 
way to do so and did not engage in any discussion with the patient about the Guidelines, this 
method of disclosure would not have the same nudge for physicians or for patients. 
241  Croskerry & Norman, supra note 97, at S26 (“People’s judgments were better calibrated 
(there was less overconfidence) when they were obliged to take account of disconfirming 
evidence . . . . This consider-the-opposite strategy appears to be one of the more effective 
debiasing strategies.”). 
242  Id. at S25–26. 
243  See Shaffer, supra note 7, at 731 (recognizing the effectiveness of “accountable justifica-
tion” in the overprescribing of antibiotics). 
244  Their physician would, of course, remain free to explain why he or she believes the 
Guideline does not offer the best practice under the circumstances. Likewise, patients would 
remain free to deviate from a Guideline based on their own personal preference. 
245  See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 153, at 5. But see Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. 
Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 665 (2011) (argu-
ing that required disclosures empirically fail to improve decisions). 
246  See AMA Ethics Opinion, supra note 188, at 555 (encouraging physicians to “make rec-
ommendations” but only recognizing an “ethical obligation to help the patient make choices 
from among the therapeutic alternatives consistent with good medical practice”); see also 
Epstein, supra note 6, at 1301 (“nothing in the law requires that physicians promote any par-
ticular option over another”). 
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ommendation, their recommendation may be less reliable than Guideline rec-
ommendations due to inadequate evidence, insufficient time, limited viewpoint, 
or cognitive bias.247 So, Guidelines create a more consistent and trustworthy 
default for patients.248 
Mandating disclosure of Guidelines should also nudge patient decision 
making through a sort of warning function. As discussed previously, having to 
confront contrary evidence is an effective de-biasing tool.249 If patients have to 
acknowledge Guidelines before deviating from them, this process should lead 
to fewer heuristic mistakes.250 Addressing a conflict between national consen-
sus Guidelines and an individual physician’s contrary recommendation should 
help to counter authority bias. Similarly, recognizing contrary Guideline rec-
ommendations should encourage patients to reconsider how their own decisions 
may be skewed by single factor bias, emotions, evaluability weaknesses, or 
other mistake.251 
It is worth acknowledging, however, that disclosing Guidelines may have a 
cost for patients who choose to deviate anyway. While some patients will opt 
for recommended care after being nudged by Guideline disclosure, those pa-
tients who still choose to deviate from Guidelines after disclosure may actually 
feel worse for knowing that they are deviating.252 For at least some patients, the 
nudge may evoke negative emotions like guilt or anxiety.253 Such costs, while 
possible, are greatly offset by the larger benefit of improving decision making 
and decreasing unwarranted variance in care.254 
Requiring disclosure of Guideline recommendations should improve the 
knowledge and decision making of both physicians and patients, without limit-
                                                        
247  See supra Section II.B. 
248  See Moulton & King, supra note 63, at 89 (showing that without a recommendation and 
discussion, patients are “vulnerable to numerous decision-making biases and effectively 
cheat[ed] . . . out of an accessible expert opinion.”). Moreover, when a physician recommen-
dation and Guideline recommendation agree, this consistency and corroboration generates an 
even more persuasive default for patients. 
249  Croskerry & Norman, supra note 97, at S26; Moulton & King, supra note 63, at 88 (“en-
gaging in a treatment discussion with a physician can greatly assist patients to identify any 
biases or misconceptions”). 
250  See Croskerry & Norman, supra note 97, at S25–26; Moulton & King, supra note 63, at 
88; Shaffer, supra note 7, at 733–34. 
251  See Moulton & King, supra note 63, at 88. 
252  See Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 150 (2006) 
(proposing that social comparison nudges may act as an emotional tax on “bad” behavior); 
Linda Thunström, Welfare Effects of Nudges: The Emotional Tax of Calorie Menu Labeling, 
14 JUDGMENT & DEC. MAKING 11, 11 (2019) (finding that using calorie information to nudge 
better eating emotionally taxes those with lower self-control). 
253  Id. 
254  Moreover, any increased internal dissonance should be no greater nor more pernicious 
than a patient currently feels when going against a physician recommendation. Arguably, it 
will be less because the personal relationship is removed. 
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ing physician discretion or patient choice. It should also nudge care towards 
more rational, scientifically based approaches that increase quality.255 
C. Requiring Guideline Disclosure Furthers Ethical Goals and Begins 
Broader Informed Consent Realignment 
Physicians should also be required to disclose Guidelines to patients for 
ethical reasons. Four primary ethical principles underlie the normative frame-
work of healthcare: autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice.256 
Autonomy is the principle that patients should be “free to choose” between ap-
propriate alternative care options, including declining care.257 Beneficence is 
the principle that care should “do good” for patients.258 Non-maleficence is the 
principle that physicians should first “do no harm.”259 Justice is the principle 
that individuals should be treated fairly and resources should be distributed eq-
uitably.260 
1. Improving Decision Making Enhances Ethics 
Unwarranted variance in care indicates a failure of all four ethical princi-
ples. Physicians who over-treat, undertreat, or mistreat patients often provide 
no benefit, risk harm, and at least from a systemic perspective, fail to treat like 
patients alike.261 Such approach is also contrary to meaningful autonomy, un-
less the patient understands that such care is not supported empirically nor rec-
ommended by expert consensus before consenting. Empiric evidence establish-
                                                        
255  Ultimately, whether (or when) requiring disclosure of Guideline recommendations im-
proves knowledge and results in more recommended care poses empiric questions. These 
questions can and should be answered definitively through empiric research. 
256  See, e.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL 
ETHICS passim (5th ed. 2001) (arguing that dilemmas in bioethics should be resolved by ap-
plying the principles of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice). 
257  See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., BIOETHICS: HEALTHCARE LAW AND ETHICS 15 (8th ed. 
2018). 
258  Id. 
259  Id. 
260  Id. at 16. 
261  Unwarranted variations in care cannot be explained by discrimination alone and are 
common even for privileged groups. See Steven M. Asch et al., Who Is at Greatest Risk for 
Receiving Poor-Quality Health Care?, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1147, 1147 (2006) (conclud-
ing that the “differences among sociodemographic subgroups . . . are small in comparison 
with the gap . . . between observed and desirable quality of health care”). Nonetheless, one 
clear benefit of greater Guideline adherence should be less discrimination in healthcare. See, 
e.g., Dartmouth—Racial Disparities, supra note 11 (describing racial disparities in care as a 
result of failure to provide recommended care, but also noting geographic, hospital, and pro-
vider influence). Studies show that implicit bias impacts the care patients receive. See Chloë 
FitzGerald & Samia Hurst, Implicit Bias in Healthcare Professionals: A Systematic Review, 
BMC MED. ETHICS, Mar. 1, 2017, at 1, 13. Moving to a more scientifically based approach 
should decrease this injustice. 
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es that adherence to Guidelines improves patient outcomes.262 Since requiring 
disclosure of Guidelines is expected to improve adherence, such reform should 
bring healthcare more in line with its underlying ethical goals. 
Stents provide a useful illustration.263 When physicians implant a stent in a 
stable patient contrary to Guidelines, they likely provide no benefit. Stents do 
not decrease the risk of heart attack nor do they extend lives.264 Moreover, be-
cause one in fifty patients suffer serious complications or die as a result of stent 
implantation, contraindicated stent implantation violates the principle of non-
maleficence; it may do serious harm.265 When some stable patients receive 
stents inappropriately and others do not, this also violates justice, as similarly 
situated patients do not receive the same treatment.266 Mandatory disclosure of 
Guidelines helps to avoid these ethical violations by nudging physicians and 
patients toward recommended care, enhancing quality of care and core ethical 
values.267 
2. Requiring Guideline Disclosure Helps to Align Informed Consent with 
Autonomy 
Autonomy merits more in depth discussion. In the United States, the ethi-
cal and legal doctrine of informed consent seeks to protect patients’ autonomy 
in healthcare decision making. Unfortunately, however, currently required dis-
closures fail to help patients make decisions that maximize individual utility. 
Almost twenty-five years ago, Peter Schuck identified the significant gap be-
tween the ethical goals and reality of informed consent.268 This gap exists 
largely because informed consent laws only mandate information disclosure, 
while autonomous decision making requires patient understanding.269 The legal 
requirements of informed consent track formal and objective disclosure instead 
                                                        
262  Murad, supra note 3, at 429; Proietti et al., supra note 3, at 917 (finding guideline adher-
ence associated with lower mortality among elderly atrial fibrillation patients); Wöckel et al., 
supra note 3, at 120, 126 (showing less guideline adherence tracked lower survival in breast 
cancer patients). 
263  Autonomy is omitted here so that it can be discussed in greater detail below. See infra 
Section IV.C.2. However, to the extent the patients who receive the contraindicated stent are 
unaware of the Guideline recommendation, their autonomy has been undermined even if 
they received the standard risk-and-benefits disclosure and “consented” because they were 
denied critical context from which to understand their choice. 
264  Stergiopoulos & Brown, supra note 91, at 312. 
265  Epstein & ProPublica, supra note 90. 
266  See Masoudi et al., supra note 94, at 1433 tbl.4, 1436. 
267  Nudging patient decision making toward greater Guideline adherence is ethically defen-
sible because it is welfare promoting. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Ethics of Nudging, 32 YALE 
J. REG. 413, 450 (2015). 
268  Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 903–05 (1994) (iden-
tifying the gap and describing it as structural and intractable). 
269  Pope, supra note 121, at 17. Time constraints and economic realities also contribute to 
the gap. Schuck, supra note 268, at 921–22. 
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of more substantive but subjective understanding. This poses a problem be-
cause the disclosure of information is necessary for patient understanding, but it 
is often not sufficient. 
An arguably larger problem, however, stems from misalignment between 
the type of information that is legally compelled and patient understanding.270 
Empiric studies have repeatedly shown that patients cannot effectively process 
the information on risks, benefits, and alternatives informed consent legally 
compels.271 Weighing risks and benefits requires numeracy and evaluability 
that patients lack, and expecting patients to compare risks and benefits of alter-
nate treatment options only compounds the cognitive overload.272 It is therefore 
unsurprising that patients often either defer to their physicians or use heuristics 
to select a “bad” care option that fails to further their individual utility. 
For too long the legal doctrine of informed consent has ignored empiric ev-
idence regarding what patients can understand and how they make decisions. 
This must change. States need to reconsider informed consent requirements 
with the teachings of health literacy and behavioral economics in mind. This 
will require reevaluating how and when patients are provided information and 
asked to decide, as well as more traditional debates regarding what information 
to provide.273 The remedy proposed in this Article is only a first step in what 
should be a much broader reform of informed consent requirements.274 
Requiring disclosure of Guideline recommendations should help to align 
informed consent with understanding, however.275 Guideline recommendations 
                                                        
270  To be clear, this article does not necessarily advocate curtailing existing disclosures. 
Even if most patients cannot understand them, some do. Moreover, dignity may require risk 
and benefit disclosures, even when the information disclosed exceeds comprehension. In-
formed consent has ethical value as a process, recognizing the patient as an active agent not 
merely an object of treatment, as well as for improving outcomes. 
271  Korobkin, supra note 128, at 540; see Hibbard & Peters, supra note 69, at 415–16. 
272  Ancker & Kaufman, supra note 81, at 714–16; Epstein, supra note 6, at 1283–84; Hib-
bard & Peters, supra note 69, at 415–16; Korobkin, supra note 128, at 540; Peters et al., su-
pra note 128, at 741; Schwartz et al., supra note 128, at 972. 
273  See generally Schmidt et al., supra note 116; Schmidt et al., supra note 134. Compelling 
evidence suggests that well-designed patient decision aids can improve patient understand-
ing. Pope, supra note 121, at 13. 
274  There may be good reasons to structure legal informed consent requirements so that they 
are objective and predictable, even recognizing that this could leave a gap between disclo-
sure and understanding. However, there is no justification for continuing to ignore how pa-
tients actually understand and process information. The legal doctrine should at least aim 
directly at the ethical goal. 
275  See Shlomo Cohen, Nudging and Informed Consent, 13 AM. J. BIOETHICS 3, 6, 8 (2013) 
(“Not only need nudging not damage autonomy but it can enhance it  . . .  [It can] assist peo-
ple in making choices compatible with their own goals.”); Korobkin, supra note 128, at 527 
(arguing that choice architecture can be used to “increase the likelihood that the individuals 
will be able to make personally utility-maximizing choices[,]” in proposing an insurance 
market that he contends could enable consumers to contract for coverage that met or exceed-
ed a certain level of cost-effectiveness); Abraham P. Schwab, Formal and Effective Autono-
my in Healthcare, 32 J. MED. ETHICS 575, 579 (2006) (“[Effective autonomy] requires for-
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are far easier for patients to comprehend than traditional raw data on risks, ben-
efits and options.276 Recommendations are simply easier to process cognitively. 
They avoid the problems patients experience with numeracy, probabilities, 
evaluability, and complex weighing of multi-variable factors in the standard 
risks-and-benefits disclosure.277 They provide the bottom line. As a result, dis-
closing Guideline recommendations should help combat behavioral biases and 
empower patient decision making.278 
In addition to being easier to understand, disclosure of Guideline recom-
mendations also serves autonomy by providing critical information for in-
formed decision making.279 When there is a “right” answer empirically, as with 
effective care, it is not enough to describe raw risks and benefits to patients, 
then, present them with options.280 Patients also need to be told that strong em-
piric evidence and a national expert consensus supports a single option. Such 
context is indispensable, and the failure to share it is harmful and arguably mis-
leading.281 It suggests that all options presented are equal, setting patients up to 
                                                                                                                                
mal autonomy, but goes beyond it by requiring attention to the background conditions in 
which decision makers will more accurately reflect their desires through their decisions. Ef-
fective autonomy is fostered if and only if biases resulting from bounded cognition are iden-
tified as risks in the decision-making processes of autonomous people and this followed by 
appropriate debiasing.”). 
276  In fact, physicians, who have far more education and experience than patients, over-
whelmingly prefer to receive Guideline recommendations in addition to evidence summaries 
of risks and benefits. Ignacio Neumann et al., Do Clinicians Want Recommendations? A 
Multicenter Study Comparing Evidence Summaries with and Without GRADE Recommenda-
tions, 99 J. CLIN. EPIDEMIOLOGY 33, 37–38 (2018) (finding 86 percent of physicians pre-
ferred recommendations accompany evidence summaries of risks and benefits). 
277  Some might argue that this approach could cause patients to provide too much deference 
to Guidelines, and that such deference undermines rather than enhances autonomy. I disa-
gree. Patients have so far to go before they provide Guideline recommendations with the 
weight that they deserve, the risk of blindly following Guidelines is relatively small in com-
parison to the costs of the current approach. Moreover, providing an optimal default does not 
undermine autonomy. Like glasses, a good default helps patients see, but it does not limit 
patient choice any more than glasses limit sight. Patients remain free to deviate from Guide-
lines, cheaply and easily. They just have better information from which to decide. See Sun-
stein, supra note 267, at 415–16, 427, 438 (showing that ethical nudges promote informed 
choice, combat behavioral biases, and educate). 
278  While some may argue that nudging the recommendation undermines autonomy by re-
moving agency, this argument misses that patients retain agency, even with a nudge, because 
they retain choice. See id. at 415, 438. Moreover, since so many patients currently defer 
blindly to their individual physician recommendation, improving the recommendation to 
which they defer should be welfare enhancing. 
279  This ethical claim is different from the others in that it does not rest on the assumption 
that disclosure of Guidelines will improve knowledge, understanding, or decision making 
outcomes. It claims that providing such information to patients is an ethical imperative inde-
pendent of outcome based on the duty to disclose material information. 
280  See Dartmouth—Effective Care, supra note 17. 
281  Guidelines help patients evaluate any physician’s recommendation as well as their own 
initial preferences for care. 
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pick poorly or to waste significant cognitive effort struggling with what should 
be an easy decision.282 While patients with idiosyncratic preferences should 
remain free to pick the care option that comports with their values and prefer-
ences, the failure to disclose Guideline recommendations undermines autono-
my by omitting crucial information.283 
Even when Guidelines relate to preference-sensitive care, they provide pa-
tients with better information to decide in a way that is more likely to maximize 
their individual utility.284 If a patient understands that the evidence is mixed re-
garding the best option and that the expert consensus is that patients should de-
cide based on which risk is more important to them, that information aids deci-
sion making.285 It simplifies the decision to a more manageable one and directs 
                                                        
282  Improved beneficence and non-maleficence with increased Guideline adherence arguably 
present the most compelling ethical argument for requiring disclosure of Guidelines prior to 
deviation. However, this benefit depends on disclosure effectively changing the care actually 
provided. While there is strong reason to believe that this would prove to be the case empiri-
cally, this article contends that disclosure is ethically required even if it does not materially 
change care. 
283  Whether government insurance or other shared cost systems should pay any added costs 
associated with such care is, of course, a quite different question. 
284  See Sunstein, supra note 267, at 431–32. 
285  Similarly, some Guideline skeptics point to conflicting Guidelines to argue that Guide-
lines should not play a more prominent role. However, only a small number of Guidelines 
conflict, and the conflict is usually narrow. Moreover, even conflicting Guidelines can still 
provide helpful information to patients. 
For example, there are conflicting Guidelines on breast cancer screening for low risk women 
between the ages of 40 and 45. Compare U.S. Preventative Services Task Force Guidelines 
and ACOG Guidelines, AM. COLL. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGISTS, BREAST CANCER RISK 
ASSESSMENT AND SCREENING IN AVERAGE RISK WOMEN (July 2017), https://www.acog.org/-
/media/Practice-Bulletins/Committee-on-Practice-Bulletins----Gynecology/Public/pb179.pdf 
?dmc=1&ts=20181105T1829304931 [https://perma.cc/37MW-W64C] [hereinafter ACOG]; 
Final Recommendation Statement, Breast Cancer: Screening, U.S. PREVENTATIVE SERVS. 
TASK FORCE (Jan. 2016), https://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/Page/Document/Re 
commendationStatementFinal/breast-cancer-screening1 [https://perma.cc/W6QY-G4ZK] 
[hereinafter U.S. PREVENTATIVE SERVS.]; Some Guidelines do not recommend routine 
mammograms. ACOG, supra, at 12. Others recommend screening annually, and still others 
contend that biannual screening is appropriate. Id. at 4 tbl.1. Such conflicting advice need 
not be confusing or unhelpful, however. The Guidelines agree that the risk of breast cancer 
for this population is relatively small and that false positive screening results, with accompa-
nying anxiety and expense, are fairly common. Id. at 5; see also U.S. PREVENTATIVE SERVS., 
supra. They also agree that routine screening can detect a small number of cancers early 
enough to save some lives. ACOG, supra, at 2; U.S. PREVENTATIVE SERVS., supra. They dis-
agree only regarding whether the aggregate risk associated with the common problem of 
false positives outweighs the very small but also very serious risk of not catching the cancer 
early enough to cure it. See ACOG, supra, at 5–6. 
Narrowing recommended treatment choices and explaining the competing values should help 
patients. Physicians simply need to tell patients that, under age 45, even the experts do not 
agree, and so whatever seems right is an appropriate choice. Having personally been told to 
get a mammogram yearly, then experienced a follow up mammogram, subsequent ultra-
sounds, an hour-long MRI, and ultimately a biopsy, I wish I had been told that many experts 
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the patient to the most important consideration. Guideline disclosure serves an 
important educational purpose. 
Moreover, even if Guideline disclosure does not change the outcome of pa-
tient decision making, the process itself has ethical value. It recognizes patients 
as active agents, not merely objects of treatment.286 Providing patients the in-
formation for optimal decision making accords them dignity and respect.287 
Some scholars disagree. They contend that, in light of patients’ cognitive 
biases and other limitations, the emphasis on autonomy in healthcare decision 
making is misplaced.288 Without question, patients are imperfect decision mak-
ers, but it would be wrong to abandon or even to lessen the role of patient deci-
sion making. Aside from cost, healthcare decisions primarily impact patients 
alone. Moreover, only patients can provide insight into their personal values 
and preferences.289 Further, studies suggest that the process of being included 
in decision making may increase patients’ knowledge, decrease patients’ anxie-
ty, and lead to better treatment adherence.290 So, for these reasons, patient deci-
sion making, like democracy, is the worst form of decision making, except for 
all the others.291 Autonomy remains an essential priority, both as an end in it-
self and for its ability to enhance quality of care. Physicians should be required 
to disclose Guidelines to empower patient autonomy and to enhance the other 
fundamental ethical principles underlying healthcare, prior to deviation. 
                                                                                                                                
do not recommend screening because false positives are so common. I wasn’t told and only 
learned of the other Guidelines after several grueling months. While thinking I could have 
avoided the anxiety of so many tests suggesting cancer and the thousands of dollars in medi-
cal co-pays may only be hindsight bias, at least I would have been informed, and it would 
have been my choice. 
286  This view falls within the right to health approach to health policy and practice, which 
considers active participation critical to quality and acceptability of care. See generally Of-
fice of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, CESCR General Comment No. 14: The Right to 
the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12), ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000); 
HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CHANGING WORLD (Michael A. Grodin et al. eds. 2013). 
287  This is not intended to suggest that patients who decline such information should be 
forced to receive it. Autonomy also allows patients the freedom to choose not to be informed 
or to participate. 
288  See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 6, at 1256–58. 
289  Berg, supra note 117, at 594. 
290  Id.; Anne E.M. Brabers et al., What Role Does Health Literacy Play in Patients’ In-
volvement in Medical Decision-Making?, PLOS ONE, Mar. 3, 2017, at 1–2. 
291  See The Worst Form of Government, INT’L CHURCHILL SOC’Y, https://www.winstonchurc 
hill.org/resources/quotes/the-worst-form-of-government/ [https://perma.cc/5FK4-GFX3] 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2019) (“Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in 
this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it 
has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those others 
forms . . . .”) (quoting Winston S. Churchill, Address at the House of Commons, (Nov. 11, 
1947)). 
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D. A National Entity Should Certify Guidelines to Ensure Reliability 
For mandatory Guideline disclosure to realize these practical and norma-
tive goals, a neutral, independent organization will need to delineate which 
Guidelines merit disclosure. Without question, some Guidelines lack trustwor-
thiness. If there is not a system to certify well-developed Guidelines, poorly 
formed and unreliable or dated Guidelines could undermine acceptance of and 
deference to other Guidelines.292 Or worse, such Guidelines could hurt rather 
than improve physician and patient decision making. To avoid this, an inde-
pendent and neutral organization must serve as gatekeeper, and there must be a 
transparent, fair, efficient, and effective certification process.293 
The federal government has provided one possible model for certifying 
Guidelines. Since 1999, the National Guideline Clearinghouse (“NGC”) has 
published all submitted Guidelines that meet its “Inclusion Criteria” in a single 
searchable database, available at no charge through the Internet.294 Since June 
2014, the NGC Inclusion Criteria has required that Guidelines contain a care 
recommendation designed to optimize care for a specific clinical circum-
stance.295 The Inclusion Criteria also demands that Guideline recommendations 
be based on a systematic review of evidence and that the expert panel submit 
documentation of that review.296 Guidelines must include an assessment of the 
benefits and harms of care options, as well as proof that the expert panel devel-
oped, reviewed, or revised the Guideline within the past five years.297 Funding 
                                                        
292  See Chih-Ming Liang, Rethinking the Tort Liability System and Patient Safety: From the 
Conventional Wisdom to Learning from Litigation, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 327, 373–74 
(2015) (inconsistent quality of guidelines limits their legal use); Mello, supra note 6, at 653, 
686–88 (describing diversity, multiplicity and unregulated sources of guidelines and the 
challenges to legal use created thereby, in the context of malpractice liability); Taylor, supra 
note 192, at 290 (showing bias in the development of some guidelines should limit their legal 
use). 
293  See 2011 IOM STANDARDS, supra note 26, at 4–5 (recommending a mechanism to identi-
fy trustworthy guidelines); Shekelle, supra note 153, at 757–58. Many developed countries 
utilize a single, centralized entity to issue Guidelines. See, e.g., AUSTL. NAT’L HEALTH & 
MED. RES. COUNCIL, https://www.nhmrc.gov.au [https://perma.cc/A9SV-38SA] (last visited 
Apr. 4, 2019); NAT’L INST. HEALTH & CARE EXCELLENCE, https://www.nice.org.uk [https://p 
erma.cc/H6BJ-EYXP] (last visited Apr. 4, 2019). While there may be benefits in the United 
States to allowing multiple groups to issue Guidelines, as per the status quo, the failure to 
certify reliable Guidelines seems likely to jeopardize the effectiveness and to undermine the 
benefits of any mandatory disclosure reform. 
294  About NGC and NQMC, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. QUALITY, https://www.ahrq.gov 
/gam/about/index.html [https://perma.cc/VNC4-PCZ5] (last updated July 2018); Inclusion 
Criteria, supra note 36. The NGC is a website and database sponsored by the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality, originally created in partnership with the AMA and the 
American Association of Plans (now America’s Health Insurance Plans). 
295  Inclusion Criteria, supra note 36. This requirement contrasts with an evidence summary 
alone or with more generalized recommendations. 
296  Id. 
297  Id. 
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for the NGC expired July 16, 2018, however, and it is not yet clear what new 
entity may step in to perform a similar role.298 
Whether it is the NGC or another organization, in order to realize their 
promise, Guidelines must be accessible in a single database that is freely avail-
able and easily searchable.299 The Guidelines included in that database must 
meet the minimal NGC Inclusion Criteria and satisfy other appropriate indicia 
of reliability.300 Guidelines that fail to adhere to a sufficient threshold of scien-
                                                        
298  Shekelle, supra note 153, at 758; Guidelines and Measures Updates, AGENCY FOR 
HEALTHCARE RES. QUALITY, https://www.ahrq.gov/gam/updates/index.html [https://perma.cc 
/R5VJ-9582] (last updated Sept. 2018) (stating that in August 2018, AHRQ launched a one 
year study to “identify new models for disseminating and accessing” Guidelines). The ECRI 
Institute, a nonprofit organization that previously contracted with the federal government to 
develop and maintain the NGC is now offering ECRI Guidelines Trust, a website with sum-
marized guidelines and TRUST ratings on how well each guideline meets the IOM Stand-
ards. Haifa Kassis, The National Guideline Clearinghouse Has Closed. What’s Next?, 33 
AM. MED. WRITERS ASS’N J. 133, 133 (2018); FAQs, ECRI INST., http://guidelines.ecri.org/a 
sk-us [https://perma.cc/P89N-UAW4] (last visited Apr. 4, 2019). While this organization has 
experience, their website currently has few guidelines because they were not able to use 
NGC content. FAQs, supra. It is not yet clear whether the ECRI will adequately fill the hole 
left by the NGC closing. 
299  The medical profession has fought hard to retain professional self-regulation, and some 
resist increased salience of Guidelines as a threat to this professional autonomy. Guidelines 
should not be seen as a threat to self-regulation, however, in as much as an evolution. Physi-
cians typically play the leading role in drafting Guidelines, and the NGC was created in part-
nership with the AMA. About NGC and NQMC, supra note 294; see also Amir Qaseem et 
al., The Development of Clinical Practice Guidelines and Guidance Statements of the Ameri-
can College of Physicians: Summary of Methods, 153 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 194 (2010). 
Guidelines may actually be essential to retaining professional self-regulation. Existing per-
sistent and pervasive unwarranted variances in care are embarrassing and harmful. If physi-
cians do not revise their practices to make care more scientifically based, they could face far 
more significant challenges to self-regulation. 
300  Guidelines that satisfy the NGC Inclusion Criteria may still vary substantially in quality. 
This stems primarily from differences in the strength of evidence underlying them, the 
strength of the recommendation contained therein, and the appropriateness of the develop-
ment process. To address such differences and to improve the relevance and reliability of 
Guidelines, in 2011, the Institute of Medicine published eight standards for trustworthy 
Guidelines (“IOM Standards”). The IOM Standards mandate: (1) transparency, (2) disclo-
sure and management of conflict of interests, (3) group composition, including patient partic-
ipation and a multi-disciplinary panel, (4) compliance with separate IOM standards for sys-
tematic reviews of CER, (5) rating strength of evidence and of recommendation, (6) specific 
and clear articulation of recommendations, (7) external review, and (8) updating. 2011 IOM 
STANDARDS, supra note 26, at 75–137. The IOM Standards largely overlap with the Grading 
of Recommendations, Assessment, Development, and Evaluation (“GRADE”) approach de-
veloped in 2003 and the Guidelines International Network and the World Health Organiza-
tion criteria. Murad, supra note 3, at 424. 
From the end of 2017 until being defunded mid-2018, the NGC published an assessment of 
the extent to which each new Guideline adhered to IOM Standards (“NEATS Assessment”), 
rating compliance with each of the eight IOM standards either yes or no or from poor to ex-
cellent. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NAT’L GUIDELINE CLEARINGHOUSE, 
NATIONAL GUIDELINE CLEARINGHOUSE EXTENT ADHERENCE TO TRUSTWORTHY STANDARDS 
(NEATS) INSTRUMENT (2017), available at https://www.guideline.gov/documents/neats_inst 
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tific basis and trustworthiness would do more harm than good and should not 
be required disclosures. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, physicians should be required to disclose Guideline recom-
mendations to patients as part of informed consent, prior to any deviation.301 
Unwarranted variations in care reflect pervasive shortcomings in physician and 
patient decision making that threaten the health of Americans. Better adherence 
to Guidelines could help alleviate this problem, but Guidelines will not be able 
to realize their promise as long as physicians discount them and patients lack 
knowledge of them. 
Structuring legal and ethical obligations to nudge physicians and patients to 
follow Guideline recommendations more often should minimize unjustified 
variations in care, without limiting professional judgment or patient choice. 
Disclosure will improve knowledge of Guidelines and help to combat cognitive 
biases that cause physicians and patients to make poor choices. While disclo-
sure will not result in perfect adherence, elevating the role of evidence-based, 
consensus Guideline recommendations should improve quality of care and pro-
vide better, more understandable information to empower patient choice.302 
                                                                                                                                
rument.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20171002200826/https://www.guideline.gov/docu 
ments/neats_instrument.pdf]. This NEATS Assessment allowed physicians, patients, and 
policymakers to quickly and easily determine the trustworthiness of a new Guideline. 
Guidelines that rate yes or at least yes or “good” on all eight IOM Standards address most 
historic criticisms associated with Guidelines. They are transparent regarding the strength of 
recommendation, as well as the evidence and value judgments underlying that conclusion. 
Id. They minimize and disclose potential conflicts of interest and incorporate patient-
preferences and patient-centered outcomes. Id. They are updated regularly. Id. 
Reasonable people could disagree regarding whether or not mandatory disclosure should be 
limited to Guidelines meeting this rigorous criteria or some lesser one. 81 percent of physi-
cians want to receive recommendations even when based on “poor” strength of evidence. 
Neumann et al., supra note 276, at 38–39. So, there is ample reason to believe that patients 
might likewise value such information. Nonetheless, there is also reason to be concerned that 
requiring disclosure of less reliable Guideline recommendations might cause confusion or 
otherwise undermine broader adherence efforts. This article does not resolve this dispute but 
instead identifies existing metrics that rate the trustworthiness of Guidelines, and leaves open 
the question of whether or not to impose additional requirements beyond the NGC Inclusion 
Criteria, and if so at what exact level, prior to mandatory disclosure. 
301  Other initiatives to address macro reforms and to improve Guideline dissemination 
should also be adopted to eliminate unwarranted care variances. 
302  “Perfect” adherence should be understood as following the care recommendation con-
tained in a Guideline, absent patient preference or necessary clinical variation. 
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